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Civil Liberty and the Response to Terrorism
Paul Rosenzweig*
In any civilized society the most important task is achieving a
proper balance between freedom and order. In wartime, rea-
son and history both suggest that this balance shifts in favor
of order - in favor of the government's ability to deal with
conditions that threaten the national well-being.1
Everyone does not share Chief Justice Rehnquist's vision of the
balance between liberty and order. The past several months have
seen the growth of a new movement - call it the "anti-anti-
terrorism" movement, if you will. The thesis of the movement,
which has some of the appearances of a political campaign, is that
steps being taken domestically to combat the potential for terror-
ist attacks are too intrusive and a threat to cherished civil liber-
ties.
The principal focus of the campaign is the USA PATRIOT Act,
2
a law passed with overwhelming support in Congress immediately
following the September 11th terrorist attacks.3 Taking many
* Senior Legal Research Fellow, Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, The Heritage
Foundation; Adjunct Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. Portions of
this paper were presented at a debate on the Patriot Act hosted by the Federalist Society of
Duquesne Law School, whom I thank for the opportunity to speak. I also thank Todd
Gaziano, Rachel Brand, Dan Gallington, K A. Taipale and Jim Dempsey for their contribu-
tion to my education on various matters discussed in this paper. They, of course, bear no
responsibility for any errors that remain and, indeed, doubtless disagree with many of the
conclusions drawn herein.
1. WILLIAM REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 222
(1998).
2. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26,
2001).
3. Typical of the public criticism was the recent resolution of the National League of
Cites, calling for repeal of various portions of the Patriot Act. See Audrey Hudson, Cities in
Revolt over Patriot Act, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2004. A number of cities and municipalities
have passed similar resolutions. See, e.g, Jessica Garrison, L.A. Takes Stand Against Pa-
triot Act, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 22, 2004, at B4. Responding to these criticisms, President Bush
has called for reauthorization of the Patriot Act. See State of the Union (Jan. 20, 2004)
("The terrorist threat will not expire on [a] schedule. Our law enforcement needs [the Pa-
triot Act] to protect our citizens.").
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forms, the campaign argues that various provisions of the Patriot
Act, and related laws and practices, have greatly infringed upon
American liberties, while failing to deal effectively with the threat
of terror. Criticism of the anti-terrorist campaign is not, however,
limited to the Patriot Act - many other aspects of the Bush Ad-
ministration's domestic response to terrorism have come under
fire. To some degree, the Patriot Act as conceived by the public is
broader than its actual provisions. Its very name has come to
serve as a symbol for all of the domestic anti-terrorist law en-
forcement actions. It has become, if you will, a convenient short
hand formulation for all questions about the alteration in the bal-
ance between civil liberty and national security that have occurred
since September 11th.
There are two over-arching themes that animate criticism of the
Patriot Act (using the phrase now in the broad, symbolic sense
already noted): First, critics of the Patriot Act frequently decry the
expansion of executive authority in its own right. They, generi-
cally, equate the potential for abuse of Executive Branch authority
with the existence of actual abuse. They argue, either implicitly
or explicitly, that the growth in executive power is a threat,
whether or not the power has, in fact, been misused in the days
since the anti-terrorism campaign began. In essence, these critics
come from a long tradition of limited government that fears any
expansion of executive authority, notwithstanding the potential
for benign and beneficial results, because they judge the potential
for the abuse of power to outweigh the benefits gained.
The second theme of many criticisms of the Patriot Act and
other government responses is one we might call a fear of technol-
ogy. In service of our efforts to combat terrorism, the government
has begun to explore ways of taking advantage of America's supe-
rior capacity to manage data through new information technolo-
gies. The Transportation Security Administration's proposal for a
new computer-assisted passenger screening program (CAPPS II)
is one such program.
These new technologies offer two advantages over current inves-
tigative practices - they have the potential to both expand the
ambit of the information available to federal law enforcement and
intelligence agencies and to enhance the efficiency with which
4. CAPPS II stands for Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II. See 68
Fed. Reg. 45265 (Aug. 1, 2003) (describing program). The CAPPS II program is discussed
in more detail in Section II of this paper.
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those agencies are able to examine and correlate information al-
ready in their possession. And both possibilities raise correspond-
ing fears among critics of the programs. Expanded access to in-
formation increases executive power. And with great efficiency
comes more effective use of power. Thus, the hesitancy to use new
technology, though sometimes born of technological apprehension,
also resonates with the principal theme of critics, a reluctance to
expand the capacity of the government to examine the lives of in-
dividuals.5
Criticism of the Patriot Act, however, sometimes misapprehends
important distinctions. First, the criticism often blurs potential
and actuality. To be sure, many aspects of the Patriot Act (and
other governmental responses) do expand the power of the gov-
ernment to act. And Americans should be cautious about any ex-
pansion of government power, for assuredly such expansion ad-
mits of the potential for abuse. But by and large, the potential for
abuse of new Executive powers has proven to be far less than crit-
ics of the Patriot Act have presumed it would be.6
5. A third theme underlying criticism of the Patriot Act is more clearly political. As is
to be expected, criticism of the Bush Administration's response to terrorism has, inevitably,
become a part of the political landscape. See, e.g., MoveOn.org, The Administration is Us-
ing Fear as a Political Tool, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2003) (full page ad reprinting excerpts of
speech by former Vice President A] Gore). It is no coincidence that many Democratic presi-
dential candidates garner great applause with the "novel" suggestion that, if elected, they
will fire Attorney General Ashcroft. E.g. Carl Matzelle, Gephardt Talks the Talk Steel-
workers Want to Hear, CLEVE. PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 7, 2003, at A24 (promise to fire Ashcroft
"within first five seconds" of new administration); Greg Pierce, Inside Politics, WASH.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2003, at A6 (noting "frenzy" of "Ashcroft bashing"). To the extent that
criticism of the Patriot Act and related activities is purely political, the debate over these
truly difficult questions is diminished. Thoughtful criticism recognizes both the new reali-
ties of the post-September 11th world and the potential for both benefit and abuse in gov-
ernmental activity.
6. The Inspector General for the Department of Justice has reported that there have
been no instances in which the Patriot Act has been invoked to infringe on civil rights or
civil liberties. See Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 1001 of the USA Pa-
triot Act (Jan. 27, 2004); see also Report Finds No Abuses of Patriot Act, WASH. POST, Jan.
28, 2004, at A2. This is consistent with the conclusions of others. For example, at a Senate
Judiciary Committee Hearing on the Patriot Act Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) said that
"some measure of the criticism [of the Patriot Act] is both misinformed and overblown."
His colleague, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) said: "I have never had a single abuse of
the Patriot Act reported to me. My staff ... asked [the ACLU] for instances of actual
abuses. They... said they had none." Even the lone Senator to vote against the Patriot
Act, Russ Feingold (D-WI) said that he "supported 90 percent of the Patriot Act" and that
there is "too much confusion and misinformation" about the Act. See Senate Jud. Comm.
Hrg. 108th Cong, 1st Sess. (Oct. 21, 2003). These views, from Senators outside of the Ad-




Second, much of the belief in the potential for abuse stems from
a misunderstanding to the true nature of the new powers that
government has deployed to combat those threats. To a surprising
degree, opposition to the executive response to terror is premised
on a mistaken, and sometimes overly apocalyptic, depiction of the
powers that have accrued to the government.
More fundamentally, those who fear the expansion of executive
power in the war on terrorism offer a mistaken solution - prohibi-
tion. While we could afford that solution in the face of traditional
criminal conduct, we cannot afford that answer in combating the
threat of terror. In the context of current circumstances, vigilance
and oversight, enforced through legal, organizational and techni-
cal means, are the answer to potential abuse - not prohibition.
We must keep a watchful eye to control for the risk of excessive
encroachment, but if we do, the likelihood of erosion of civil liber-
ties can be substantially reduced.
This article addresses many of the conceptions and misconcep-
tions attending the public debate on the threat to civil liberty from
the expansion of executive power. Section I outlines some basic
principles that should guide the analysis of the Patriot Act, and
related expansions of government power. It summarizes some of
the relevant history and attempts to identify relevant similarities
and difference between past experiences and the contemporary
situation. It then offers some basic principles for use in assessing
the potential threat to civil liberties posed by various legal and
technological changes. Section II then conducts a detailed analy-
sis of some of these changes, acknowledging at several points that
ambiguity and the potential for abuse exists, at others that real
problems may arise, and arguing, at others, that criticisms of the
Patriot Act have strayed away from reality and into a sort of my-
thology.7
7. The principal focus of this article is domestic law enforcement efforts under the
Patriot Act and related changes in FBI investigative guidelines, as well as efforts by the
Transportation Security Administration. Thus, though not exclusively focused on the pro-
visions of the Act, the article's scope is narrow and leaves for analysis in other forums dis-
cussions of the legal aspects of military or quasi-military responses to terrorism such as the
detention of "enemy combatants" in America or the detention of "unlawful combatants" at
Guantanamo Bay. Though those actions can be analyzed using the same framework
adopted by this article, they raise substantially distinct legal issues.
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I. THE CONTEXT WITHIN WHICH WE ACT - THE CHANGING NATURE
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY
To begin with, the analysis of the expansion of domestic efforts
to combat the potential for terrorism needs to be placed in its ap-
propriate context. To a very real degree, one's assessment of the
Patriot Act rests upon that context - how one views the history of
American responses in times of war, what one views as the consti-
tutional constraints on the use of Executive power, and whether,
in the end, one places the threat of terror into the "law enforce-
ment" box, or the "intelligence" box for legal analysis. In this sec-
tion, I examine some of this context, and begin making the argu-
ment that the war on terror is not a law enforcement problem in
the classical sense, and thus, that most of the difficulties in analy-
sis stem from trying to fit the square peg of law enforcement prac-
tices into the round hole of terrorist reality.
A. The Lessons Of History
As we consider the American response to terrorism and the use
of executive power, many caution against repeating past excesses.
They see, in history, a series of lessons about over-reactions in the
face of war. In this vision, past responses to threats necessarily
lead to good faith, but over-zealous response. The tension between
civil liberty and national security is but one example of how we
return to the same fundamental issues over and over again. Con-
sider the following history:8
In 1798, the Napoleonic wars raged in Europe. President John
Adams, a Federalist, effectively brought the United States into a
state of undeclared war with France, on the side of the British.
Thomas Jefferson and the Democratic Republican party opposed
these measures as likely to provoke an unnecessary war. The Fed-
eralists, in turn, accused the Jeffersonians of treason.
8. This summary of the history is substantially derived from a lecture Professor Geof-
frey Stone of the University of Chicago recently gave to the Supreme Court Historical Soci-
ety. See Geoffrey Stone, Civil Liberties in Wartime, 28 J.S. CT. HIST. 215 (2003). This arti-
cle provides a far more detailed summary and understanding of these historical events, and
is the source of much of the historical information summarized below, though it reaches
different conclusions regarding the lessons to be drawn from that history. See also Paul
Rosenzweig, Securing Freedom And The Nation: Collecting Intelligence Under The Law,
Testimony Before the United States House of Representatives, Permanent Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence (Apr. 9, 2003) (discussing lessons of history).
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To exacerbate the situation, the Federalist Congress enacted the
Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.9 The Alien Act authorized the
president to deport any non-citizen he judged dangerous to the
peace and safety of the United States, without a hearing or the
right to present evidence. The Sedition Act prohibited the publi-
cation of false, scandalous and malicious writings against the gov-
ernment, the Congress or the president with intent to bring them
into contempt or disrepute. These were, in effect, aggressive ef-
forts to suppress political criticism of Adams, his policies, and his
administration. The Act expired by its terms, and after Jefferson
replaced Adams as President, he pardoned all those who were
convicted under the act. Though never tested in the Supreme
Court, these acts are widely regarded as having been unconstitu-
tional and a stain on American liberty.
During the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln suspended
the writ of habeas corpus on eight occasions. The broadest such
suspension declared that "all persons . . . guilty of any disloyal
practice... shall be subject to court martial."1' As many as 38,000
civilians were imprisoned by the military, in reliance on this au-
thority." In 1866, a year after the war ended, the Supreme Court
ruled that the president was not constitutionally empowered to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus, even in time of war, if the ordi-
nary civil courts were functioning. 2 Here, again, the suspension is
remembered by some as an excessive response to a crisis and has
come to be regarded as an unfortunate wartime error.
In 1917, the United States entered World War I. During the
war, federal authorities acting under the aegis of the Espionage
Act 3 prosecuted more than 2,000 people for their opposition to the
war. As a result, virtually all dissent with respect to the war was
suppressed. Though the Supreme Court initially approved most
federal actions in support of the war, 4 over the next half-century,
9. See An Act Concerning Aliens, 5th Cong., 2d Sess, 1 Stat 570-72; An Act Concern-
ing Enemy Aliens, 5th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 Stat 577-78 (the Alien Acts); An Act for the Pun-
ishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, 5th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 Stat. 596-97
(the Sedition Act).
10. Roy P. BALSER ET AL. EDS., THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 436-37
(Rutgers Univ. Press 1953-55).
11. MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES 113-38 (Oxford 1991); see also REHNQUIST, supra note 1, at 49-50 (estimating
13,000).
12. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
13. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. I, § 3, 40 Stat. 219.
14. E.g., Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. U.S., 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
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the Court overruled every one of its World War I decisions, effec-
tively repudiating the excess of that war-time era."
Finally, and most notoriously, on Feb. 19, 1942, President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066,6 which
authorized the Army to "designate military areas" from which
"any persons may be excluded." Over the next eight months, more
than 110,000 people of Japanese descent were forced to leave their
homes in California, Washington, Oregon and Arizona. Though
the Supreme Court upheld the president's action, 7 it has come to
be recognized as a grave error. In 1988, President Ronald Reagan
offered an official presidential apology and reparations to each of
the Japanese-American internees. 8
Some see in this history a cautionary note. As Professor Stone
has said: "In time of war - or, more precisely, in time of national
crisis - we respond too harshly in our restriction of civil liberties,
and then, later regret our behavior." 9 And we should not disre-
gard that caution.
But reading too much into this history is a mistake - potentially
quite a grave one. First, and most obviously, it disregards the re-
ality of necessity. As Justice Arthur Goldberg so famously said,
"while the Constitution protects against invasions of individual
rights, it is not a suicide pact." ° And while some of these reac-
tions were plainly over-reactions (nobody argues today that the
internment of the Japanese served a useful military purpose), oth-
ers were not.
Many, for example, think that Lincoln's suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus was essential to the prosecution of the war.2'
15. E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
16. 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (1942).
17. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
18. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 903, Pub. L. 100-383 (Aug. 10, 1988).
19. Stone, supra note 8, at 215.
20. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963). Justice Goldberg was
quoting Justice Robert Jackson, who made the same observation in Terminnelo v. Chicago,
337 US. 1 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
The choice is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty with order and an-
archy without either. There is danger that, if the court does not temper its doctri-
naire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of
Rights into a suicide pact.
Id. at 37 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
21. E.g., HARRY V. JAFFA, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE
COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 364 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. 2000):
There can hardly be any question but that the provision for suspending the writ of
habeas corpus is placed in the Constitution to enable the government to provide for
the public safety in the case of a rebellion. Where in the Constitution it is placed is
Summer 2004 Patriot Act 669
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Some argue that it was necessary to protect the troops, save Mary-
land for the Union, and secure the safety of Washington, D.C.22
Lincoln certainly felt the necessity.23 And later in the war, the
anti-draft riots in New York (made cinematically famous just a
short while ago in "Gangs of New York") threatened to deprive the
Union army of conscripts.24 Had that happened (though, of course,
a counter-factual can never be proven), Lincoln feared a prema-
ture end to the war - leaving the United States divided and slav-
ery ongoing." Using the authority granted him by Congress in the
Habeas Corpus Act,26 Lincoln directed the draft boards to ignore
writs of habeas corpus issued to them by state courts seeking re-
lease of the conscripts.27 It is not unreasonable to argue that,
however de jure improper Lincoln's acts were, they were de facto a
justified necessity that ought, in retrospect, to be praised.
The first lesson here is that we should not be too harsh in our
retrospective judgments - hindsight is always 20/20. But as we
live within the times and face the challenges of today, we must be
at least a little generous in our self-review, for we will not know
for many years whether or not our fears of today are well-founded.
wholly subordinate to why it is there at all. Lincoln's suspension of the writ is there-
fore lawful. Q.E.D.
Id.; William Rehnquist, Civil Liberty and the Civil War, GAUER LECTURE (NLCPI 1997).
Lincoln felt that the great task of his administration was to preserve the Union ....
[]t is in the nature of the presidency during wartime to focus on accomplishment of.
... strategic ends on an emergency basis without too much regard for any resulting
breaches in the shield which the Constitution gives to civil liberties. Perhaps it may
be best that the courts reserve serious consideration of questions of civil liberties ....
until after the war is over.
Id. at 23.
22. See NEELY, supra note 11, at 29 ("Not every historian today would credit it [i.e. the
suspension of habeas corpus] with saving Maryland for the Union, but that conclusion
became almost a truism in Lincoln's day."); Rehnquist, "All the Laws But One" Online
Newshour, Nov. 11, 1998, interview with Chief Justice Rehnquist, available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/gergen/november98/gergen.1l-1l.html (Lincoln's suspension
protected troop movements and Washington, D.C.).
23. Lincoln made the argument in a special address to Congress on July 4, 1861. See
DON FEHRENBACHER, ED., SPEECHES AND WRITINGS: 1859-1865 246-62 (1989).
24. The draft riots have been called the greatest instance of domestic violence in United
States history. See JAMES G. RANDALL & DAVID DONALD, THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION 361 (2d ed. 1961). They were no trivial threat to the Union's ability to
wage war successfully.
25. NEELY, supra note 11, at 69-70 (quoting HOWARD K. BEALE, ED., THE DIARY OF
EDWARD BATES, 1859-1866 306 (Gov't. Printing Off. 1933).
26. An Act relating to Habeas Corpus, and regulating Judicial Proceedings in Certain
Cases, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755, 755 (1863).
27. The relevant text of the proclamation (issued on September 15, 1863), which sus-
pended the writ nationwide in cases involving draftees and deserters, is reprinted in




Indeed, by comparison with past excesses, this history should
actually give us some comfort. Many who are concerned with cur-
rent activities think that we are on a downward spiral towards
diminished civil liberties. But a better view of this history shows
that the balance between liberty and security is more like a pen-
dulum that gets pushed off-center by significant events (such as
those of September 11th) than a spiral. Over time, after Ameri-
cans have recovered from the understandable human reaction to
catastrophe and after the threat recedes, the pendulum returns to
center.
We should acknowledge the historical reality that when the
wartime crisis passes, the balance swings back in favor of freedom
and liberty. And since World War II, our society has matured
such that the scope of the swing in the pendulum is not nearly as
great as it had been in the past. Whatever one may think of the
detention of three Americans as enemy combatants, for example,
there can be little disagreement that the detention of three Ameri-
cans (whose detention is based upon some quantum of individual-
ized suspicion), is sufficiently different in degree from the whole-
sale detention of over 100,000 Japanese-Americans (whose deten-
tion was ordered in the complete absence of any individualized
suspicion) as to be different in kind.28 To quote Chief Justice
Rehnquist:
[T]here is every reason to think that the historic trend against
the least justified of the curtailments of civil liberty in war-
time will continue in the future. It is neither desirable nor is
it remotely likely that civil liberty will occupy as favored a po-
sition in wartime as it does in peacetime. But it is both desir-
able and likely that more careful attention will be paid by the
courts to the basis for the government's claims of necessity as
a basis for curtailing civil liberty.9
What accounts for this seeming change in contemporary con-
text? Though little empirical evidence exists, a rough analysis can
28. See Michael Chertoff, Law, Loyalty, and Terror, THE WKLY. STANDARD 15, 16 (Dec.
1, 2003) (In response to September 11, "the government quite self-consciously avoided the
kinds of harsh measures common in previous wars.").
29. REHNQUIST, supra note 1, at 224-25. Or, as Jeffrey Rosen has written: "[None of
the legal excesses that followed 9/11 could compare to those that followed World War I."
JEFFREY ROSEN. THE NAKED CROWD 131 (Random House 2004).
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identify a number of factors, all of which contribute to greater
oversight in the exercise of executive authority, constraining the
greatest excesses. These factors would include:
: A more activist court that is far more willing to overturn
executive branch action, acting as a limit on excessive power.
Earlier times of crisis all occurred before the so-called "rights
revolution" of the 1960s and the growth of judicial power. In-
deed, the current Rehnquist Court has invalidated more acts
of Congress than any previous court, ° exhibiting a high de-
gree of involvement in curtailing authority.3'
* A more partisan Congress. Though sometimes seen as a
bad thing, the growth of partisanship has created at least one
positive benefit - a growth in the "market" for oversight of the
executive branch. Since the Watergate era, we have seen an
increasing use of Congressional investigative authority -
sometimes for good, and sometimes for ill. But the prospect of
aggressive Congressional oversight acts as a check on execu-
tive power, as even the prospect of public censure has the in
terrorem effect of preventing abuse.
* The growth of investigative journalism. Clearly, this is an-
other change that has some potential adverse consequences.
But few can deny that post-Watergate, the press has come to
more aggressively serve an important public function, expos-
ing activities that some might otherwise prefer to keep secret.
None can imagine a return to the days when the press ac-
tively participated in concealing Roosevelt's injuries, or Ken-
nedy's dalliances. And that means, equally, that the prospect
of secret prosecutions and secret searches and seizures is
minimal, at best.
30. Remarks, Akhil Reed Amar, The Heritage Foundation (July 9, 2002); cf Cass Sun-
stein, A Hand in the Matter, LEGAL AFF. (Mar./Apr. 2003) (noting that the Rehnquist Court
has struck down 26 Acts of Congress since 1995).
31. The Supreme Court has yet to accept any cases directly arising from the Patriot
Act. However, the Court's recent decision to hear both the "enemy combatants cases," see
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004); Padil-
lia v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (2004), and the
"Guantanamo detainees case," see Al Odah v. U.S., 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert.
granted, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003) (consolidated with Rasul v. Bush), reflects this activism and
the involvement of the Court at a very early stage of the war - far earlier than in past
conflicts. E.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) (decision rendered one year after hostili-
ties ended in Civil War)-
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* The rise of the public interest groups. In no other time did
Americans organize themselves into public interest groups in
the way they do now. No other era saw the existence, for ex-
ample, of numerous public interest litigation groups like the
ACLU. These organizations, through their public information
and litigation activities, act as an important check on the ex-
ercise of executive authority. They are, in effect, the "canary
in the mineshaft," serving as an early warning system of
abuse."
* The increase in the public's ability to monitor government.
Though technology, assuredly, offers greater opportunity for
our government to monitor our activities, that same technol-
ogy holds the promise of greater public accountability by en-
hancing the transparency of government functions. 3
* And, finally, the public is far more educated about civil lib-
erties today than, seemingly at any time in the past. With
the rise of the Information Age and the internet, we are far
more able to individually gather information necessary to
make decisions and to organize a response to government
power if one is deemed necessary. From the Ozzie and Har-
riet quiet of suburbia in the 1950's, we have come to a point
where many Americans are vitally concerned about freedom,
liberty, and government action and exercise their franchise
with those concerns in mind.'
As noted, there is little more than anecdotal evidence to support
this analysis - yet it has the appeal of both common sense and
consistency with contemporary experience. It appears that we
have strengthened, substantially, our ability to examine, oversee,
and correct, abuses of executive power. The public is in a stronger
32. See Michael Kinsley, An Incipient Loss of Freedom, WASH. POST, June 15, 2003, at
B07 ("The American Civil Liberties Union is alarmed, but the ACLU's function, which I
admire and support, is to be alarmed before I am, like the canary down the mineshaft.").
33. See generally DENNIS BAILEY, THE OPEN SOCIETY PARADOX: WHY THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY CALLS FOR MORE OPENNESS NOT LESS (Brassey 2004) (forthcoming); See
DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY (1999).
34. Survey evidence supports the instinct that the public is reacting cautiously.
Though immediately after September l1th, 60% agreed that the average citizen would have
to give up civil liberties to fight terrorism, by June 2002 that number had fallen to 46%.
See Amatai Etzioni & Deidre Mead, The State of Society - a Rush to Pre-9/ 11, available at
httpJ/www.gwu.edu/-ccps/TheState_oflSociety.html. One suspects the number has fallen
still further in the subsequent months.
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position today than it ever has been before. And that power of
oversight gives us freedom - freedom to grant the government
great powers when the need arises, secure in the knowledge that
we can restrain their exercise appropriately. In short, one possi-
ble lesson from history is that we should not be utterly unwilling
to adjust our response liberty and security in today's crisis of ter-
rorism - for we have the capacity to mange that adjustment, and
readjust it as necessary.35
C. The Constitutional Structure
While a large fraction of the debate over new law enforcement
and intelligence systems focuses on perceived intrusions on civil
liberties, Americans should keep in mind that the Constitution
weighs heavily on both sides of the debate over national security
and civil liberties. The President and Congressional pohcymakers
must respect and defend the individual civil liberties guaranteed
in the Constitution when they act, but there is also no doubt that
they cannot fail to act when we face a serious threat from a foreign
enemy.
The Preamble to the Constitution acknowledges that the United
States government was established in part to provide for the
common defense. The war powers were granted to Congress and
the President with the solemn expectation that they would be
used. Congress was also granted the power to "punish ... Offenses
against the Law of Nations," which include the international law
of war, or terrorism.36 In addition, serving as chief executive and
commander in chief, the President also has the duty to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed," including vigorously enforc-
ing the national security and immigration laws.
Thus, as we assess questions of civil liberty it important that we
not lose sight of the underlying end of government - personal and
national security. That balance is not a zero-sum game, by any
means. But it is vital that we not disregard the significant factors
weighing on both sides of the scales.
35. The foregoing list identifies sociological factors that will allow for enhanced over-
sight. There are likely to be technological factors as well. We can readily imagine a strong
audit function that records all use of new investigative techniques and, thus, enables us to
readily identify and punish abuse of the system. See, e.g, K. A. Taipale, Data Mining and
Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots to Make Sense of Data, 5 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L.
REV. 2 (2003) (arguing for utility of strong audit technology) (available at
http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=5&article=2).
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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Contemporary, Constitutional limitations have little to add to
this equation. Under settled modern Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence, law enforcement may secure without a warrant
(through a subpoena) an individual's bank records, telephone toll
records, and credit card records, to name just three of many
sources of data. Other information in government databases (e.g.
arrest records, entries to and exits from the country, and driver's
licenses) may be accessed directly without even the need for a
subpoena.
In 1967, the Supreme Court said that the Fourth Amendment
protects only those things in which someone has a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" and, concurrently, that anything one ex-
poses to the public (i.e., places in public view or gives to others
outside of his own personal domain) is not something in which he
has a "reasonable" expectation of privacy-that is, a legally en-
forceable right to prohibit others from accessing or using what one
has exposed.38 So, for example, federal agents need no warrant, no
subpoena, and no court authorization to:
* have a cooperating witness tape a conversation with a
third party (because the third party has exposed his
words to the public);"
* attach a beeper to someone's car to track it (because the
car's movements are exposed to the public);
40
* fly a helicopter over a house to see what can be seen;"
or
* search someone's garbage.4"
37. See, e.g., Paul Rosenzweig & Michael Scardaville, The Need to Protect Civil Liber-
ties While Combating Terrorism: Legal Principles and the Total Information Awareness
Program, LEGAL MEMORANDUM No. 6, at 12-13 (The Heritage Foundation February 2003);
Paul Rosenzweig, Anti-Terrorism Investigations And The Fourth Amendment After Septem-
ber 11: Where And When Can The Government Go To Prevent Terrorist Attacks?, Testimony
Before the United States House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcom-
mittee on the Constitution (May 20, 2003).
38. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
39. U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). A few states have consent laws that restrict the
ability of state law enforcement officials to conduct taping of telephone conversations with-
out consent.
40. U.S. v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
41. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (plurality opinion).
42. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
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Thus, an individual's banking activity, credit card purchases,
flight itineraries, and charitable donations are information that
the government may access because the individual has voluntarily
provided it to a third-party.43 According to the Supreme Court, no
one has any constitutionally based enforceable expectation of pri-
vacy in them. The individual who is the original source of this in-
formation cannot complain when another entity gives it to the
government. Nor does he have a Constitutional right to notice of
the inquiry.4 Some thoughtful scholars have criticized this line of
cases, but it has been fairly well settled for decades.45
Congress, of course, may augment the protections that the Con-
stitution provides and it has with respect to certain information.
There are privacy laws restricting the dissemination of data held
by banks, credit companies, and the like.46 But in almost all of
these laws (the Census being a notable exception),47 the privacy
protections are good only as against other private parties; they
yield to criminal, national security, and foreign intelligence inves-
tigations.
One important caveat should be made here - in the foregoing
discussion we have identified principally the restrictions that ap-
ply to domestic law enforcement officials. Important additional
restrictions continue to exist on the authority of foreign intelli-
gence agencies to conduct surveillance or examine the conduct of
American citizens. Conversely, however, the courts have recog-
nized that in the national security context, the requirements of
43. The same is true of the physical characteristics that one exposes to the public every
day. Many have ridiculed a research proposal to develop a means of identifying people from
their physical characteristics, deriding it as the "Ministry of Silly Walks." Others fear such
a capacity. But the government already has the authority and the capacity to identify an
individual by surveillance photographs whenever he or she walks out the front door. (They
may not, however, use technology to penetrate that door. Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27 (2001)).
From a legal perspective, the "better telephoto lens" proposed is not off limits.
44. SEC v. O'Brien, 467 U.S. 735 (1984). The lack of entitlement to notice flows, ac-
cording to the Court, from the individual's abandonment of a claim of privacy arising from
conveying the information to a third party. Id. at 743 (citing U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,
443 (1973)).
45. E.g., James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age: Revitalizing
the Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 65 (1997).
46. E.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 3402, 3403 (bank disclosure); id. § 3407 (subpoenas to bank).
47. E.g., 13 U.S.C. §§ 8, 9 (prohibition on disclosure of Census data); id. § 214 (penalties
for disclosure). Recent reports claiming that Census data has been used to test the new
CAPPS II algorithm, see Drew Clark, The Outcry Over Airline Passenger Records, NAT'L J.
TECH. DAILY (Jan. 26, 2004), have been categorically denied by the Census Bureau. See
Letter, Jefferson D. Taylor, Chief, Cong. Affairs Office, to Hon. Adam Putnam (Jan. 23,
2004).
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the Fourth Amendment apply somewhat differently than they do
in the context of domestic law enforcement."
D. Type I and Type II Errors - The Reality of Terrorism
The full extent of the terrorist threat to America cannot be fully
known.49 Consider, as an example, one domestic aspect of that
threat-an effort to determine precisely how many al-Qaeda op-
eratives are in the United States at this time and to identify those
who may enter in the future.
Terrorism remains a potent threat to international security.
The U.S. State Department has a list of over 100,000 names
worldwide of suspected terrorists or people with contact to terror-
ists. 50  Before their camps in Afghanistan were shut down, Al
Qaeda trained at least 70,000 people and possibly tens of thou-
sands more.5' Al Qaeda linked Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia is
estimated to have 3,000 members across Southeast Asia and is
still growing larger. 2 Although the estimates of the number of al-
Qaeda terrorists in the United States have varied since the initial
attack on September 11, the figure provided by the government in
recent, supposedly confidential, briefings to policymakers is
5,000.53 This 5,000-person estimate may include many who are
engaged in fundraising for terrorist organizations and others who
were trained in some fashion to engage in jihad, whether or not
they are actively engaged in a terrorist cell at this time. But these
48. Important restrictions continue to exist on the authority of foreign intelligence
agencies to conduct surveillance or examine the conduct of American citizens. E.g., Exec.
Order No. 12333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted at 50 U.S.C. § 401 note; Attorney General
Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investi-
gations (Apr. 1983) (National Academy of Science, Legal Standards for the Intelligence
Community in Conducting Electronic Surveillance (Feb. 2000), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/standards.html) . However, as stated above, the courts have
recognized that in the national security context, the requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment apply somewhat differently than they do in the context of domestic law enforcement.
See U.S. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (applying Fourth Amendment in
context of domestic national security surveillance); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (For-
eign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (applying Fourth Amendment in context of foreign intelli-
gence surveillance).
49. This discussion is taken from Rosenzweig & Scardaville, supra note 37, at 5-6.
50. Eric Lichtblau, Administration Creates Center for Master Terror "Watch List,"
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2003.
51. During an interview on NBC's Meet the Press, U.S. Senator Bob Graham was
quoted as saying, ". . . al-Qaeda has trained between 70,000 and 120,000 persons in the
skills and arts of terrorism. "Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, July 13, 2003).
52. Terence Hunt, Bush Shows Resolve by Visiting Bali, Chi. Sun-Times, Oct. 22, 2003,
at 36.
53. Bill Gertz, 5,000 in U.S. Suspected of Ties to al Qaeda, WASH. TIMES, July 11, 2002.
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and other publicly available statistics support two conclusions: (1)
no one can say with much certainty how many terrorists are living
in the United States; and (2) many who want to enter in the fore-
seeable future will be able to do so.
Understanding the scope of the problem demonstrates the diffi-
culty of assessing the true extent of the risk to the United States.
Consider this revealing statistic: "[M]ore than 500 million people
[are] admitted into the United States [annually], of which 330 mil-
lion are non-citizens."54 Of these:
* Tens of millions arrive by plane and pass through im-
migration control stations, often with little or no exami-
nation.55
* 11.2 million trucks enter the United States each year."
Many more cars do so as well; more than 8.5 million cars
cross the Buffalo-Niagara bridges each year alone, and
only about 1 percent of them are inspected."
* According to the Department of Commerce, approxi-
mately 51 million foreigners vacationed in the United
States last year, and this figure is expected to increase to
5861 million in three years.
* There are currently approximately 11 million illegal
aliens living in the United States. Roughly 5 million en-
tered legally and simply overstayed their lawful visit.59
* Over half a million foreign students are enrolled in
American colleges, representing roughly 3.9 percent of to-
tal enrollment, including:
1. 8,644 students from Pakistan.
54. White House, Securing America's Borders Fact Sheet, available at
www.whitehouse.gov (last accessed Jan. 14, 2003).
55. Office of Travel and Tourism Industries, Inbound Travel to the U.S., U.S. Dept. of
Commerce, available at http://tinet.ita.doc.gov/outreachpages/inbound.generalinformation.
inboundoverview.html?ticart_ cookie=20030127.125013.04230.
56. White House, supra note 54.
57. MICHELLE MALKIN, INVASION: How AMERICA STILL WELCOMES TERRORISTS,
CRIMINALS, AND OTHER FOREIGN MENACES TO OUR SHORE 8 (Regnery Publishing Inc.,
2002).
58. Office of Travel and Tourism Industries, supra note 55.
59. MALKIN, supra note 57, at xii, 197.
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2. A total of 38,545 students from the Middle East,
including 2,216 from Iran, 5,579 from Saudi Arabia,
and 2,435 from Lebanon, where Hezballah and other
terrorist organizations train.
3. About 40,000 additional students from North
African, Central and Southeast Asian nations where
al-Qaeda and other radical Islamic organizations
have a strong presence."
To be sure, not all of these visitors pose a risk - but their sheer
volume demonstrates the scope of the potential risk that some
within this group do pose.
And, of course, the threat is not exclusively internal. The new-
est terrorist target may be global shipping. The world is particu-
larly vulnerable to maritime terrorism and maritime piracy is
growing increasingly rampant.6 Lloyd's List has reported that
terrorists might be training maritime pilots in the Malacca Straits
in order to capture a ship, pilot it into a port or chokepoint and
detonate it.
62
This illustrates the other part of the story. The danger to Amer-
ica posed by terrorists arises from the new and unique nature of
potential acts of war. Virtually every terrorism expert in and out
of government believes there is a significant risk of another at-
tack. Unlike during the Cold War, the threat of such an attack is
asymmetric. In the Cold War era, U.S. analysts assessed Soviet
capabilities, thinking that their limitations bounded the nature of
the threat the Soviets posed. Because of the terrorists' skillful use
of low-tech capabilities (e.g. box cutters), their capacity for harm is
essentially limitless. The United States therefore faces the far
more difficult task of discerning their intentions. Where the Sovi-
ets created "things" that could be observed, the terrorists create
only transactions that can be sifted from the noise of everyday ac-
tivity only with great difficulty. It is a problem of unprecedented
scope, and one whose solution is imperative if American lives are
to be saved.
As should be clear from the outline of the scope of the problem,
the suppression of terrorism will not be accomplished by military
60. Institute of International Education, Open Doors, available at
http://opendoors.iienetwork.org.
61. See, e.g., William Langewische, Anarchy at Sea, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 2003).
62. Lloyd's List International, Asia Pirates Training for Terrorist Attack, Oct. 15, 2003.
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means alone. Rather, effective law enforcement and/or intelli-
gence gathering activity are the key to avoiding new terrorist acts.
Recent history supports this conclusion.63 In fact, police have ar-
rested more terrorists than military operations have captured or
killed. Police in more than 100 countries have arrested more than
3000 Al Qaeda linked suspects,64 while the military captured some
650 enemy combatants.65  Equally important, it is policing of a
different form - preventative rather than reactive, since there is
less value in punishing terrorists after the fact when, in some in-
stances, they are willing to perish in the attack.
The foregoing understanding of the nature of the threat from
terrorism helps to explain why the traditional law enforcement
paradigm needs to be modified (or, in some instances, discarded)
in the context of terrorism investigations. The traditional law en-
forcement model is highly protective of civil liberty in preference
to physical security. All lawyers have heard one or another form
of the maxim that "it is better that 10 guilty go free than that 1
innocent be mistakenly punished."6 This embodies a fundamen-
tally moral judgment that when it comes to enforcing criminal
law, American society, in effect, prefers to have many more Type
II errors (false negatives) than it does Type I errors (false posi-
tives).67 That preference arises from two interrelated grounds:
one is the historical distrust of government that, as already noted,
animates many critics of the Patriot Act. But the other is, at least
implicitly, a comparative valuation of the social costs attending
the two types of error. We value liberty sufficiently highly that we
see a great cost in any Type I error. And, though we realize that
Type II errors free the guilty to return to the general population,
thereby imposing additional social costs on society, we have a
common sense understanding that those costs, while significant,
63. See, e.g., Dana Dillon, War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Developing Law En-
forcement, BACKGROUNDER No. 1720 (Heritage Foundation Jan. 22, 2004).
64. Peter Slevin, U.S. Pledges Not to Torture Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, June 27,
2003, at A01.
65. Francis Taylor, Transcript: State Dept Official Says War Against Terrorism Con-
tinues, June 9, 2003, available at http'//usembassy.state.gov/tokyo/wwwh2003O6lla6.html.
66. E.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 367 n.158 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
The aphorism has its source in 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, ch. 27, at 358 (Wait & Co.
1907).
67. "In a criminal case.., we do not view the social disutility of convicting an innocent
man as equivalent to the disutility of acquitting someone who is guilty .... [T]he reason-
able doubt standard is bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that
it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." In re: Winship,
397 U.S. 357, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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are not so substantial that they threaten large numbers of citizens
or core structural aspects of the American polity.
The post-September 11th world changes this calculus in two
ways. First, and most obviously, it changes the cost of the Type II
errors. Whatever the cost of freeing John Gotti or John Muham-
med might be, they are substantially less then the potentially hor-
rific costs of failing to stop the next al-Qaeda assault. Thus, the
theoretical rights-protective construct under which our law en-
forcement system operates must, of necessity, be modified to meet
the new reality. We simply cannot afford a rule that "better 10
terrorists go free than that 1 innocent be mistakenly punished."68
Second, and less obviously, it changes the nature of the Type I
errors that must be considered. In the traditional law enforce-
ment paradigm, the liberty interest at stake is personal liberty -
that is, freedom from the unjustified application of governmental
force. We have as a model, the concept of an arrest, the seizure of
physical evidence, or the search of a tangible place. As we move
into the information age, and deploy new technology to assist in
tracking terrorists, that model is no longer wholly valid.
Rather, we now add related, but distinct conception of liberty to
the equation - the liberty that comes from anonymity. Anonym-
ity is a different, and possibly weaker, form of liberty: The Ameri-
can understanding of liberty interests necessarily acknowledges
that the personal data of those who have not committed any
criminal offense can be collected for legitimate governmental pur-
poses. Typically, outside the criminal context, such collection is
done in the aggregate and under a general promise that uniquely
identifying individual information will not be disclosed. Think, for
example, of the Census data collected in the aggregate and never
disclosed, or of the IRS tax data collected on an individual basis,
reported publicly in the aggregate, and only disclosed outside of
68. The closely related point, of course, is that we must guard against "mission creep."
Since the justification for altering the traditional assessment of comparative risks is in part
based upon the altered nature of the terrorist threat, we cannot alter that assessment and
then apply it in the traditional contexts. See Rosenzweig & Scardaville, supra note 37, at
10-11 (arguing for use of new technology only to combat terrorism); William Stuntz, Local
Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2183-84 (2002) (arguing for use of informa-
tion sharing only to combat most serious offenses).
69. See Phillip Kurland, The private I, U. CHI. MAG., Autumn 1976, at 8 (characterizing
three facets of privacy, broadly characterized as anonymity, secrecy, and autonomy) (quoted
in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.24 (1977)).
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the IRS with the approval of a federal judge based upon a showing
of need.7"
What these examples demonstrate is not so much that our con-
ception of liberty is based upon absolute privacy expectations, 1 but
rather that government impingement on our liberty will occur
only with good cause. In the context of a criminal or terror investi-
gation, we expect that the spotlight of scrutiny will not turn upon
us individually without some very good reason.
This conception of the liberty interest at stake (the interest that
will be lost when Type I errors occur) also emphasizes one other
point about privacy - in many ways the implementation of new
laws and systems to combat terror are not an unalloyed diminu-
tion of privacy. Rather, the laws and practices can substitute one
privacy intrusion (for example, a search of electronic data about
an individual) for another privacy intrusion (the physical intru-
siveness of body searches at airports). But this means that legal
analysts cannot make broad value judgments - each person
weighs the utility of their own privacy by a different metric. For
many Americans, the price of a little less electronic privacy might
not be too great if it resulted in a little more physical privacy - for
others the opposite result might hold. This suggests little in re-
solving the tension, save that it cautions against allowing the ten-
sion to be resolved by unrepresentative institutions like the courts
and in favor of allowing more representative institutions, like the
legislature, to do their best at evaluating the multi-variable pri-
vacy preferences of the population.
Finally, it bears noting that not all solutions necessarily trade
off Type I and Type II errors, and certainly not in equal measure.
Some novel approaches to combating terrorism might, through
technology, actually reduce the incidence of both types of error.72
More commonly, we will alter both values but the comparative
changes will be the important factor. Where many critics of the
Patriot Act and other governmental initiatives go wrong is, it
seems to me, in their absolutism - they refuse to admit of the pos-
sibility that we might need to accept an increase in the number of
Type I errors. But that simply cannot be right - liberty is not an
70. E.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7213 (prohibiting disclosure of tax information except as author-
ized for criminal or civil investigations).
71. But cf Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (recognizing that certain intru-
sions into individual privacy are beyond governmental power).




absolute value, it depends on security (both personal and national)
for its exercise. As Thomas Powers has written: "In a liberal re-
public, liberty presupposes security; the point of security is lib-
erty."73 The growth in danger from Type II errors necessitates
altering our tolerance for Type I errors. More fundamentally, our
goal should be to minimize both sorts of errors.
E. Some General Principles
Of course, just because the Congress and the President have a
constitutional obligation to act forcefully to safeguard Americans
against attacks by foreign powers does not mean that every means
by which they might attempt to act is necessarily prudent or
within their power. Considering the foregoing analysis, core
American principles would seem to require that any new counter-
terrorism technology (deployed domestically) should be developed
only within the following bounds:74
* No fundamental liberty guaranteed by the Constitution
can be breached or infringed upon.
* Any increased intrusion on American privacy interests
must be justified through an understanding of the par-
ticular nature, significance, and severity of the threat be-
ing addressed by the program. The less significant the
threat, the less justified the intrusion.
* Any new intrusion must be justified by a demonstration
of its effectiveness in diminishing the threat. If the new
system works poorly by, for example, creating a large
number of false positives, it is suspect. Conversely, if
there is a close "fit" between the technology and the
threat (that is, for example, if it is accurate and useful in
predicting or thwarting terror), the technology should be
more willingly embraced.
73. Thomas Powers, Can We Be Secure and Free?, THE PUB. INT. (Spring 2003).
74. These principles were first published in Paul Rosenzweig, Principles for Safeguard-
ing Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism, ExEcuTIvE MEMORANDUM No. 854 (The Heri-
tage Foundation, Jan. 2003).
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e The full extent and nature of the intrusion worked by
the system must be understood and appropriately lim-
ited. Not all intrusions are justified simply because they
are effective. Strip searches at airports would prevent
people from boarding planes with weapons, but at too
high a cost.
& Whatever the justification for the intrusion, if there are
less intrusive means of achieving the same end at a rea-
sonably comparable cost, the less intrusive means ought
to be preferred. There is no reason to erode Americans'
privacy when equivalent results can be achieved without
doing so.
* Any new system developed and implemented must be
designed to be tolerable in the long term. The war against
terror, uniquely, is one with no immediately foreseeable
end. Thus, excessive intrusions may not be justified as
emergency measures that will lapse upon the termination
of hostilities. Policymakers must be restrained in their
actions; Americans might have to live with their conse-
quences for a long time.
From these general principles can be derived certain other more
concrete conclusions regarding the development and construction
of any new technology:
* No new system should alter or contravene existing legal
restrictions on the government's ability to access data
about private individuals. Any new system should mirror
and implement existing legal limitations on domestic or
foreign activity, depending upon its sphere of operation.
* Similarly, no new system should alter or contravene ex-
isting operational system limitations. Development of
new technology is not a basis for authorizing new gov-
ernment powers or new government capabilities. Any
such expansion should be independently justified.
* No new system that materially affects citizens' privacy
should be developed without specific authorization by the
American people's representatives in Congress and with-
out provisions for their oversight of the operation of the
system.
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e Any new system should be, to the maximum extent
practical, tamper-proof. To the extent the prevention of
abuse is impossible, any new system should have built-in
safeguards to ensure that abuse is both evident and
traceable.
* Similarly, any new system should, to the maximum ex-
tent practical, be developed in a manner that incorpo-
rates technological improvements in the protection of
American civil liberties.
* Finally, no new system should be implemented without
the full panoply of protections against its abuse. As
James Madison told the Virginia ratifying convention:
"There are more instances of the abridgment of the free-
dom of the people by gradual and silent encroachments of
those in power than by violent and sudden usurpations.""
These theoretical considerations and operational guidelines,
while useful in constructing an ex ante heuristic for assessing new
programs and law, are only of real value in application to concrete
problems and proposed solutions. It is not enough to condemn
every governmental initiative. Nor is it apt to afford the govern-
ment a blank check for all actions designed to repel terror.
Rather, each program and proposal must be carefully assessed on
its own individual merits. Measured against these standards, the
Patriot Act, and related governmental programs hold up fairly
well - by and large they are of little practical threat to civil liberty
and they hold the promise of significant benefit.
II. THE PATRIOT ACT AND OTHER INITIATIVES - WHAT IS MYTH AND
WHAT IS REALITY?
Because specifics matter, it is not useful to generalize about
various aspects of the Patriot Act (using the phrase now in a more
focused sense). Some of the areas in which the law and policy
have changed in the past 2 years are absolutely vital. In others,
the potential for abuse is real, but the fears of abuse are over-
blown. In still others, there is cause for real concern. Each exer-
cise of enhanced executive authority must be taken on its own
75. Speech to the Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 16, 1788, reprinted in Matthew
Spalding, ed., THE FOUNDERS' ALMANAC 133 (The Heritage Foundation, 2002).
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terms and merits. To a large degree, despite the popular view of
the Patriot Act as a single unitary enactment, the various provi-
sions can only be judged independently.
A. The Necessity of the Patriot Act - Information Sharing
The broadest criticism of the Patriot Act is that it was unneces-
sary - that it has added nothing to the efforts to avoid additional
terrorist activities and that it is little more than a compilation of a
"wish list" of law enforcement powers. This view, however, lacks
persuasive force.
In particular, one aspect of the Patriot Act, embodied in Sec-
tions 202 and 218, was absolutely vital. Section 202 permits law
enforcement information gathered under the aegis of a grand jury
investigation to be shared with intelligence agencies. Section 218
allows the use of intelligence information gathering mechanisms,
whenever the gathering of intelligence information is a "signifi-
cant" purpose of the investigation and allows the information
gathered to be shared with law enforcement. Taken together,
these two sections, in effect, tear down an artificial "wall" that ex-
isted between law enforcement and intelligence agencies and per-
mit their cooperation. 6
Prior to the Patriot Act, a very real wall existed. It was derived
from an earlier standard, requiring the use of intelligence-
gathering mechanisms only when foreign intelligence was the
76. Some critics decry even this modest change. The ACLU has argued against the
easing of grand jury restrictions: "While some sharing of information may be appropriate in
some limited circumstances, it should only be done with strict safeguards .... The bill
lacks all of these safeguards. As a result it may lead to the very abuses that the Church
Committee exposed decades ago." ACLU, How the USA-Patriot Act Puts the CIA Back in
the Business of Spying on Americans, Oct. 23, 2001, available at
http://archive.aclu.org/congess/1102301j.html. It has also decried the expansion of author-
ity to use the intelligence gathering authority of the FISA court: "It permits the FBI to
conduct a secret search or to secretly record telephone conversations for the purpose of
investigating crime even though the FBI does not have probable cause of crime. The sec-
tion authorizes unconstitutional activity - searches and wiretaps in non-emergency circum-
stances - for criminal activity with no showing of probable cause of crime." See ACLU,
How the USA-Patriot Act Enables Law Enforcement to Use Intelligence Authorities to Cir-
cumvent the Privacy Protections Afforded in Criminal Cases, Oct. 23, 2001, available at
http://archive.aclu.org/congress/102301i.html.
Opposition to information sharing is not new and not limited to the ACLU. In
2000, responding to the concerns of the National Commission on Terrorism, Senator Jon
Kyl proposed a discretionary information sharing regime. See Kyl Amdt. to S. 2507, § 610
(106th Cong. 2d Sess.) (proposing to allow disclosure of information by law enforcement
agents to intelligence agents). The Department of Justice opposed this amendment. See
Letter, Robert Raben, Asst. Atty. General to Sen. Jon Kyl (Sept. 28, 2000).
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"primary purpose" of the activity.77 This old "primary purpose"
standard derived from a number of court decisions.78 That stan-
dard was formally established in written Department guidelines
in July 1995. 79 While information could be "thrown over the wall"
from intelligence officials to prosecutors, the decision to do so al-
ways rested with national-security personnel - even though law-
enforcement agents are in a better position to determine what evi-
dence is pertinent to their case. The old legal rules discouraged
coordination, and created what the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Court of Review calls "perverse organizational incentives."0
The wall had some very negative real-world consequences. For-
mer Department of Justice official Victoria Toensing tells of one:8
In the 1980's, terrorists hijacked an airplane, TWA Flight 847,
which eventually landed in Lebanon. At the time that negotia-
tions were ongoing, the FBI had the capacity (pursuant to a FISA
warrant) to intercept the communications between the hijackers
on the plane and certain individuals in America. Negotiations did
not, however, advance quickly enough and the terrorists killed an
American, Robert Stethem, and graphically dumped his body onto
the airport tarmac on live TV. The Department of Justice, as a
result, announced its intention to capture and prosecute those re-
sponsible, which had the immediate effect that the FBI's ongoing
intercepts were no longer for the "primary" purpose of foreign in-
telligence gathering - the "primary" purpose was now clearly
prosecution. And as a result, in the middle of a terrorist crisis, the
FBI turned off its listening devices for fear of violating the prohi-
bition against using intelligence gathering techniques in a
situation where intelligence gathering was not the primary pur-
pose. It is difficult to conceive of a more wrong-headed course of
77. These intelligence-gathering mechanisms typically involved the application for a
warrant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), a court created by the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The FISC, which hears applications ex parte and
often in camera, authorizes foreign intelligence information gathering acts (e.g. wiretaps or
subpoenas for information).
78. E.g., U.S. v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
79. See Procedures for Contacts Between the FBI and the Criminal Division Concern-
ing Foreign Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations, July 19, 1995,
cited in In re: Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 727-28; see also Final Report of the Attorney Gen-
eral's Review Team on the Handling of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Investigation,
ch. 20, at 721-34, May 2000, cited in Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 728 (describing effects of
wall); "Primary Purpose" and the Sharing of Information Among the FBI, OIPR, and the
Criminal Division, available at http:/www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/bellows20.pdf (un-
dated memorandum describing effect of July Guidelines).
80. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 743.
81. Victoria Toensing, Justice is Blind, Not Deaf, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2002, at A12.
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conduct, yet the FBI, rightly, felt that it was legally obliged to act
as it did.
Nor is this the only instance in which the artificial "wall" has
deterred vital information sharing between law enforcement and
intelligence communities. Who can forget the testimony of FBI
agent Coleen Rowley, who pointed to these very limitations as
part of the reason the FBI was not able to "connect the dots" be-
fore September 11th.8" Instead, the culture against information
sharing was so deeply ingrained that during the criminal prosecu-
tions for the first 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the Depart-
ment of Justice actually raised the height of the artificial wall.
Imposing requirements that went "beyond what is legally re-
quired," the Department instructed its FBI agents to "clearly
separate" ongoing counterintelligence investigations from the
criminal prosecution.83 There is even some possibility that this
wall may have been the contributing factor to our failure to pre-
vent the attacks of September 11th."
Sections 202, and 218 tear down this wall, and empower federal
agencies to share information on terrorist activity. This is an im-
portant, significant, positive development. One of the principle
criticisms made in virtually every review of our pre-September
11th actions is that we failed to "connect the dots." Indeed, as the
Congressional review panel noted: "Within the Intelligence Com-
munity, agencies did not share relevant counter-terrorism infor-
mation, prior to September 11th. This breakdown in communica-
tions was the result of a number of factors, including differences in
agencies' missions, legal authorities and cultures."85
82. See Testimony of Coleen Rowley Before the United States Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, June 6, 2002, available at http'//judiciary.senate.ogv/testimony.cfm?id=279
&witid=628.
83. See Memorandum from Jaime S. Gorelick, Deputy Attorney General, Instructions
on Separation of Certain Foreign Counterintelligence and Criminal Investigations (1995).
84. See Testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft before the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Apr. 13, 2004). The Attorney General quotes
one frustrated FBI agent who wrote:
Whatever has happened to this - someday someone will die - and wall or not - the
public will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every re-
source we had at certain 'problems.' Let's hope the National Security Law Unit [of
the FBI] will stand behind their decision then, especially since the biggest threat to
us, UBL [Usama Bin Laden], is getting the most protection.
Id.
85. Report of the Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
107th Cong., 2nd Sess., S. Rep. No. 107-351 and H. Rep. No. 107-792, Dec. 2002, Finding
9, at xvii, available at http'/www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_rptl911rept.pdf; see also id. at
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In short, the Patriot Act changes adopt as a general principle
the rule that any information lawfully gathered during a foreign
or domestic counter-intelligence investigation or lawfully gathered
during a domestic law enforcement investigation should be capable
of being shared with other federal agencies. The artificial limita-
tions we have imposed on such information sharing are a relic of a
bygone era and, in light of the changed nature of the terrorist
threat, are of substantially diminished value today.
We have already had at least one test case demonstrating the
potential utility of enhanced information sharing between intelli-
gence and law enforcement organizations: the indictment of Sami
Al-Arian for providing material support to several Palestinian ter-
rorist organizations.86 The case, of course, has yet to be tried and
Mr. AI-Arian is by law innocent until proven guilty. Thus, the
truth of the government's assertions about him remains unproven
and has yet to be tested.
But let us consider a hypothetical case and indulge in the as-
sumption that the allegations are true. Let us imagine that, six
months from now, the trial is over. If the allegations made in the
indictment are substantiated, what will we have learned? Most
pressingly, we will have learned that the charges against Mr. Al-
Arian were delayed for at least 5 years by self-imposed legal ob-
stacles barring the sharing of information between foreign
counter-intelligence and domestic law enforcement organizations.
The government's case against Mr. A1-Arian is apparently based
upon foreign counter-intelligence wiretap intercepts that date
back as far as 1993. According to the information in those wire-
taps, Mr. A1-Arian is charged with having knowingly provided fi-
nancing to a terrorist organization with the awareness that the
funds he provided would be used to commit terrorist acts. And
that information has been in the possession of our intelligence or-
ganizations for at least the past 7 years.
It was not until the passage of the Patriot Act, and the ruling of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review in Novem-
ber 2002, that the intelligence community felt it was lawfully in a
Finding 1, at xv (concluding that both Intelligence Community and FBI were not well or-
ganized to address domestic terrorism threat).
86. See U.S. v. Al Arian, Indictment (M.D. Fla., available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/alarian/usalarian02O3ind.pdf; see also U.S. v. Al-Arian,
280 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (M.D. Fla. 2003); United States v. AI-Arian, 267 F. Supp.2d 1258
(M.D. Fla. 2003); Matter of Search of Office Suites for World and Islamic Studies Enter-
prises, 925 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
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position to provide that information to law enforcement officials at
the DOJ and the FBI. Only those changes enabled the govern-
ment to bring the charges pending against Mr. Al-Arian.
If this is true, then we have made a wise change in policy. No
one, not even Mr. Al-Arian, has publicly argued that the original
foreign intelligence scrutiny of Mr. A1-Arian was unlawful or un-
warranted. If it really is the case that one branch of our govern-
ment lawfully had in its possession information about the criminal
activity of a foreign national on American soil and that that
branch was (or believed it was) obliged by law not to disclose that
information to other branches of the government, then that fact
alone will make some of the changes wrought by the Patriot Act
worthwhile. To the extent that the law removed longstanding
statutory barriers to bringing information gathered in national
security investigations into federal criminal courts, it is to be wel-
comed.87
Nor can it be convincingly argued that the changes we have un-
dertaken are violative of the Constitution. To the contrary, as the
Court of Review recently made clear, the perverse wall between
intelligence and law enforcement was not constitutionally re-
quired, and thus, that removing was constitutionally permissible.
As the court said, the change wrought by the Patriot Act "is a rea-
sonable response based on a balance of the legitimate need of the
government for foreign intelligence information to protect against
national security threats with the protected rights of citizens."88
This is so because, as the court recognized (and as this paper
argues) there is a difference in the nature of "ordinary" criminal
prosecution and that directed at foreign intelligence or terrorism
crimes: "The main purpose of ordinary criminal law is twofold: to
punish the wrongdoer and to deter other persons in society from
embarking on the same course. The government's concern with
respect to foreign intelligence crimes, on the other hand, is over-
whelmingly to stop or frustrate the immediate criminal activity."9
This is not to say that we disregard the past. We cannot, and
should not, ignore recent unfortunate examples of government
excess: For example, the abuses of the FBI's COINTELPRO (coun-
terintelligence program) in the 1960's and 1970's, when investiga-
87. Al-Arian's case is not unique. The arrest of a suspected terrorist cell in Lacka-
wanna, New York was also aided by the sharing of information. See ROSEN, supra note 29,
at 142.
88. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 742.
89. Id. at 744.
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tive authority was used to conduct surveillance of anti-war activ-
ists and civil rights groups. 9° Similarly, as the Church Committee
investigation disclosed, our intelligence agencies have in several
instances acted beyond the bounds of the law.91 The limitations
that restrained our activity prior to September 11th grew out of
those revelations and were an appropriate, understandable reac-
tion to excess.
But we can no longer afford to hamstring our counter-terrorism
efforts in that way. The right answer is oversight and control, not
complete rejection of enhanced government capacity to combat
terror. And, these sections provide that oversight - no FISA war-
rant issues without the approval of a neutral federal judge who
reviews each application. Though the forum has changed, and the
subject matter of the investigation has been expanded, those
changes appear sensible in light of the need to maintain the confi-
dentiality of national security information used in securing the
requisite authority. It is therefore no surprise that, as adum-
brated above, the courts have already made clear "that FISA as
amended is constitutional because the surveillances it authorizes
are reasonable."92
Nor are the courts the only oversight mechanism in place. Por-
tions of Section 202 and all of Section 218 are temporary. The in-
creased information sharing authority granted to the government
will "sunset" in December 2005. Thus, the oversight function of
Congress is doubly important. It acts as a direct restraint on ex-
ecutive abuse through review. It will also be used to assess the
utility of the changes that have occurred. Based upon our limited
experience thus far, it seems that the advantages gained are sub-
stantially greater than the potential dangers posed by changes in
the investigative authority granted the executive branch - but
Congress will make assessment on a full record when it reconsid-
ers these portions of the Patriot Act next year. In doing so, it
would be wise to remember the past - and the problems that it
identified as requiring change when it initially adopted the Patriot
Act.
90. See, e.g., Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
91. See Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities, S. Rep. No. 94-755, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. (1976).
92. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 746.
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B. Increased Investigative Authority and Business Records
Perhaps no provision of the Patriot Act has excited greater con-
troversy than has Section 215, the so-called "angry librarians"
provision. The section allows the FISA court in a foreign intelli-
gence investigation to issue an order directing the recipient to
produce tangible things. The revised statutory authority is not
wholly new. FISA has had authority for securing some forms of
business records since its inception. The new statutes modifies
FISA's original business-records authority in a two important re-
spects:
* First, it "expands the types of entities that can be com-
pelled to disclose information. Under the old provision,
the FISA court could order the production of records only
from 'a common carrier, public accommodation facility,
physical storage facility or vehicle rental facility."' The
new provision contains no such restrictions.
* Second, the new law "expanded the types of items that
can be requested. Under the old authority, the FBI could
only seek 'records.' Now, the FBI can seek 'any tangible
things (including books, records, papers, documents, and
other items).' 93
Thus, the modifications made by Section 215 do not explicitly
authorizing the production of library records, but by its terms it
authorizes orders to require the production of virtually any busi-
ness record - and that might include library records, though it
would include as well, airline manifests, international banking
transaction records, and purchase records of all sorts. Critics of
the Patriot Act have decried this provision,94 but that criticism in
this instance reflects an error of the first kind identified - mistak-
ing the potential for abuse with the reality.
93. Department of Justice, The USA Patriot Act: Myth vs. Reality 16 (2003).
94. "Many [people] are unaware that their library habits could become the target of
government surveillance. In a free society, such monitoring is odious and unnecessary...
The secrecy that surrounds section 215 leads us to a society where the 'thought police' can
target us for what we choose to read or what Websites we visit." See ACLU, ACLU of New
Mexico Seeks to Protect Individual Privacy, TORCH, ACLU-New Mexico, July-Aug. 2003.
The false image created is, as one writer has characterized it, of "white-haired and apple-
cheeked [librarians] resisting as best they can the terrible forces of McCarthyism, evangeli-
cal Christian book-burning, middle-class hypocrisy, and Big Brother government." Joseph
Bottum, The Library Lie, THE WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 26, 2004, at 7. While politically
appealing, the image simply does not match reality.
692 Vol. 42
First, and most saliently, Section 215 mirrors, in the intelli-
gence-gathering context, the scope of authority that already exists
in traditional law enforcement investigations. Obtaining business
records is a long-standing law enforcement tactic. Ordinary grand
juries for years have issued subpoenas to all manner of busi-
nesses, including libraries and bookstores, for records relevant to
criminal inquiries. For example, in the 1997 Gianni Versace mur-
der case, a Florida grand jury subpoenaed records from public li-
braries in Miami Beach and in the 1990 Zodiac gunman investiga-
tion, a New York grand jury subpoenaed records from a public li-
brary in Manhattan. Investigators believed that the gunman was
inspired by a Scottish occult poet, and wanted to learn who had
checked out his books.95 In the Unabomber investigation, law en-
forcement officials sought the records of various libraries, hoping
to identify the Unabomber as a former student with particular
reading interests.96
Section 215 merely authorizes the FISA court to issue similar
orders in national-security investigations. It contains a number of
safeguards that protect civil liberties. First, Section 215 requires
FBI agents to get a court order. Agents cannot use this authority
unilaterally to compel any entity to turn over its records. FISA
orders are unlike grand jury subpoenas, which are requested
without court supervision and are only subject to challenge after
they have been issued.
Second, Section 215 has a narrow scope. It can only be used (1)
"to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United
States person"; or (2) "to protect against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities." It cannot be used to investi-
gate ordinary crimes, or even domestic terrorism. Thus, the scope
is substantially narrower than the scope of traditional law en-
forcement investigations - for in those investigations, the grand
jury may see the production of any business records unless the
95. See Patriot Acting Out, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2004. The original source for this
information is a Department of Justice publication, supra note 93, at 14.
96. See James Richardson and Cynthia Hubert, Unabomber used library at UC Davis?,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 10, 1996, available at
http://www.unabombertrial.com/archive/1996/041096-1.html (reporting that UC Davis
library provided a book to the FBI with markings relating to the Unabomber's manifesto);
cf. Patrick Hoge, Rural acquaintances say Kaczynski attracted little notice, Sacramento Bee,
Apr. 5, 1996, available at http'//www.unabombertrial.com/archive/1996/040596-2.html
(reporting on Kaczynski's reading habits at library in Montana). Some courts have inter-
preted their State constitutions to provide a First Amendment protection that does not
exist in Federal law. See, e.g., Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044 (Colo.
2002).
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subpoena recipient can demonstrate that "there is no reasonable
possibility that the category of materials the Government seeks
will produce information relevant to the general subject of the
grand jury's investigation,"9 without the necessity of showing a
connection to foreign intelligence activity or without the limitation
that prevents subjecting United States persons to scrutiny in in-
vestigations of foreign intelligence activity - the grand jury may
inquire into potential violations of any federal crime.98
Critics make two particular criticisms of this provision - that
the judicial review it provides for is a chimera, and that the provi-
sions of Section 215 imposing secrecy on the recipients of subpoe-
nas issued pursuant to the section imposes a "gag rule" that pre-
vents oversight of the use of the section's authority. Neither criti-
cism, however, withstands close scrutiny.99
Section 215 provides for judicial review of the application for a
subpoena for business records. The language provides, however,
that upon application, the court "shall" issue the requested sub-
poena. From the use of the word "shall," critics infer that the obli-
gation to issue the requested subpoena is mandatory and, thus,
that the issuing court has no discretion to reject an application.
Of course, if this were true (which, as discussed infra, it is not),
then the absence of any judicial ability to reject an application
would reduce the extent of judicial oversight.
But critics who make this argument (even if it were the case)
miss the second order effects of judicial review. It imposes obliga-
tions of veracity on those seeking the subpoenas and to premise an
objection on the lack of judicial review is to presuppose the men-
dacity of the subpoena affiants. It is also to presuppose the ab-
sence of any internal, administrative mechanisms in order to
check potential misuse of the subpoena authority. And, most no-
97. U.S. v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991).
98. A "United States person" is defined in Exec. Order 12333, pt. 3.4, as "a United
States citizen, an alien known by the intelligence agency concerned to be a permanent
resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially composed of United States
citizens or permanent resident aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the United States...
." Exec. Order No. 12333, pt. 3.4, 1981 WL 76054 (Dec. 4, 1981).
99. In the S.1709 (108th Cong.), the Security and Freedom Ensured Act of 2003 (called
the "SAFE" Act by it's sponsors), it has been proposed to require a showing of "specific and
articulable facts" before a § 215 order may be issued. See S.1709 (108th Cong.) § 4(a)(2).
That showing would impose a greater obligation on law enforcement in an intelligence
investigation than under the simple "relevance" standard that applies to federal grand
juries investigating ordinary criminal offenses. In part for this reason, the Administration
has threatened to veto the SAFE Act if it is passed. See Letter from Atty. General Ashcroft
to Sen. Orin Hatch (Jan. 28, 2004).
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tably, it presupposes that the obligation to swear an oath of truth-
fulness, with attendant perjury penalties for falsity, has no deter-
rent effect on the misuse of authorities granted. '
But even more significantly, this criticism misreads the statute,
which, while saying that the subpoena "shall" issue, also says that
it shall issue as sought or "as modified." The reviewing judge
thus, explicitly, has authority to alter the scope and nature of the
documents being sought - a power that cannot be exercised in the
absence of substantive review of the subpoena request. Thus, the
suggestion that the provisions of Section 215 preclude judicial re-
view is simply mistaken - to the contrary, it authorizes judicial
review and modification of the subpoena request which occurs be-
fore the subpoena is issued - a substantial improvement over the
situation in traditional grand jury investigations where the sub-
poena is issued without judicial intervention, and the review
comes, at the end, only if the subpoena is challenged.
Nor is judicial oversight the only mechanism by which the use of
Section 215 authority is monitored. The section expressly com-
mands that the Attorney General "fully inform" Congress of how
the section is being implemented. And on October 17, 2002, the
House Judiciary Committee, after reviewing the Attorney Gen-
eral's first report, indicated that it was satisfied with the Depart-
ment's use of section 215: "The Committee's review of classified
information related to FISA orders for tangible records, such as
library records, has not given rise to any concern that the author-
ity is being misused or abused."10'
The second criticism - that Section 215 imposes an unwar-
ranted gag rule - is equally unpersuasive. Section 215 does pro-
hibit recipients of subpoenas from disclosing that fact - a precau-
tion that is necessary to avoid prematurely disclosing to the sub-
jects of a terrorism investigation that they are subject to govern-
ment scrutiny. That prohibition might be independently justified,
100. For a similar point, see Daniel Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of
Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1124-28 (2002) (highlighting the sig-
nificance of judicial oversight and warrant requirements in maintaining an "architecture of
power" to protect privacy). Warrants raise the "standard of care of law enforcement offi-
cials by forcing them to document their requests for authorization" and the "requirement of
prior approval prevents government officials from dreaming up post-hoc rationalizations."
Id. at 1126-27. This provides an institutional/procedural check on abuse even if we assume
that magistrates routinely defer to police and prosecutors.
101. See Statement of F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. Chmn. House Jud. Comm., Oct. 17,
2002, available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/newslO17O2.htm.
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given the grave nature of the potential threats being averted (that
is, given the nature of the Type II errors involved).
But it need not be - for, again, the secrecy provisions of Section
215 merely extend existing rules in traditional law enforcement
grand juries to the more sensitive intelligence arena. In the grand
jury context, it is common for third party records custodians to be
prohibited from disclosing the existence of the document request.
Banks, for example, may be obliged to conceal requests made to
them.10 2 And it is clear, beyond peradventure, that these grand
jury secrecy obligations are constitutional. For example, when the
nanny of Joan Benet-Ramsey was called to testify before a state
grand jury, state law prohibited her from disclosing the substance
of her testimony. When she challenged that law (on the ground
that it infringed her freedom of speech), her challenge was re-
jected by the courts."
In short, critics of Section 215 make a very difficult and, in the
end, unpersuasive argument. They offer the view, in effect, that
traditional law enforcement powers that have been used in grand
juries for years to investigate common law crimes and federal
criminal offenses ought not to be used with equal authority to in-
vestigate potential terrorist threats. To many, that argument
seems to precisely reverse the evaluation - if anything, the powers
used to investigate terrorism, espionage and threats to national
security ought to be greater than those used to investigate mere
criminal behavior."° This is not, of course, to denigrate the sig-
nificance and seriousness of many federal and state crimes - but it
is to recognize that however grave those crimes are, they do not
pose the same risk to the foundations of American society or to the
security of large numbers of citizens as the risks posed by poten-
tial terrorist acts.
Critics of Section 215 do, however, have one strong argument
against renewal of the Section 215 authority (which also sunsets
102. 12 U.S.C. § 3604(c).
103. Hoffmann-Pugh v. Keenan, 338 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Hoffman-Pugh
v. Ramsey, 312 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 2002) (rejecting libel suit filed by nanny against the
Ramsey family).
104. This view is not an idiosyncratic one. At the time the Patriot Act was passed, Sena-
tor Biden (D-DE) argued that "the FBI could get a wiretap to investigate the mafia, but
they could not get one to investigate terrorists. To put it bluntly, that was crazy! What's
good for the mob should be good for terrorists." Cong. Rec. at S11048, Oct. 25, 2001, avail-
able at http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/subs/support/senbidenl02501_l.pdf, quoted in Bar-
bara Comstock, Prez Calls Dems Patriot Games Bluff, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Jan. 21, 2004,
available at http'//www.nationalreview.com/comment/comstock2004Ol2ll300.asp.
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in December 2005) - that the authority granted may be unneces-
sary. Facing wide public criticism of the provisions of the section
215, the Attorney General has disclosed that, at least as of Sep-
tember 2003, the provision had not been used to secure any re-
cords."0 5 It would seem that, since almost all terrorist acts are also
federal crimes, existing grand jury subpoena authority has been
sufficient to allow the government to secure all of the information
it has needed in the months since September 11th. But it is im-
portant to recognize that this is a question of utility, not a ques-
tion of abuse. And we know that the September 11th terrorists
did use internet connections at libraries to communicate, well
prior to the existence of any predication that they had committed
a crime."0 6 Thus, the potential utility of the section exists. As a
consequence, when Section 215 comes up for review, Congress will
need to carefully evaluate whether or not continuation of that au-
thority is necessary.
But that review must be grounded in a solid understanding of
what Section 215 actually authorizes. It should not be swayed by
the public mythology that surrounds this provision. That myth
has led to the rather absurd result that some librarians are de-
stroying their borrowing records in order to prevent them from
becoming available to the federal government.' v In other words,
those charged in our society with protecting and maintaining
knowledge and information are destroying it. The interest in pro-
tecting civil liberties must be high - but not so high that we un-
necessarily and unwisely lapse into hysteria.'
105. See Memorandum for Director Robert S. Muller, Sept. 18, 2003, available at
http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/030918doj.shtml.
106. See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, Terrorists Leave Paperless Trail, WIRED NEWS, Sept. 20,
2001, available at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,46991,00.html.
107. See, e.g., Sen. Russ Feingold, Speech on the Libraries, Bookseller and Personal
Records Privacy Act, Mar. 7, 2003, available at
http://feingold.senate.gov/speeches/03/07/2003811915.html (reporting such events); ACLU,
ACLU of Florida Urges Libraries to Warn Patrons of Government's New Domestic Spying
Powers Under the USA Patriot Act, July 30, 2003, available at
http://www.aclufl.orglbodysection2l5release.html (same).
108. As former Attorney General Meese has noted, the position adopted by librarians is
particularly odd when contrasted with their long-standing opposition to federal provisions
restricting children's on-line access to pornography. It is at least a little jarring that li-
brarians see it as their duty to protect the access of minors to pornography while denying
the government access to information of national security importance. See NBC News:
Today (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 30, 2003) (transcript available at 2003 WL
55607752). The American Library Association has also declined to condemn Fidel Castro's
jailing of librarians. See Nat Hentoff, Carrying Fidel's Water, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2004,
atA19.
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C. Searches and Seizures - Delayed Notification
Another section of the Patriot Act that has engendered great
criticism is Section 213, which authorizes the issuance of delayed
notification search warrants - the so-called "sneak and peek" war-
rants. Traditionally, when the courts have issued search warrants
authorizing the government's forcible entry into a citizen's home
or office, they have required that the searching officers provide
contemporaneous notification of the search to the individual
whose home or office has been entered. °9 Prior to September 11th,
some courts permitted limited delays in notification to the owner,
when immediate notification would hinder the ongoing investiga-
tion. Section 213 codifies that common law tradition, and extends
it to terrorism investigations. Critics see this extension as an un-
warranted expansion of authority - but here too, the fears of
abuse seem to outstrip reality."'
Delayed notification warrants are a long-existing, crime-fighting
tool upheld by courts nationwide for decades in organized crime,
drug cases and child pornography. For example, Mafia Don
Nicky Scarfo maintained the records of his various criminal activi-
ties on a personal computer, protected by a highly sophisticated
encryption technology. Law enforcement knew where the infor-
mation was - and thus had ample probable cause to seize the
computer. But the seizure would have been useless without a way
of breaking the encryption. So, on a delayed notification warrant,
the FBI surreptitiously placed a keystroke logger on Scarfo's com-
puter - the logger recorded Scarfo's password and, with the pass-
word, the FBI was able to examine all of Scarfo's records of his
various drug deals and murders."' It would, of course, have been
fruitless for the FBI to have secured a warrant to enter Scarfo's
109. The requirement has a long-standing provenance in common law. As the King's
Bench court said in 1603: "In all cases where the King is a party, the sheriff... may break
the party's house, either to arrest him, or to do execution of the King's process, if otherwise
he cannot enter. But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to
make request to open the doors." Semanyne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603).
110. Some, for example, implicitly argue that the Section 213 authority is novel: "The
Patriot Act allows the use of so called 'sneak and peek' warrants without informing the
occupants if a judge decides that giving notice would hurt the government's investigation,"
ROSEN, supra note 29, at 137. As the text makes clear, the Patriot Act neither creates a
new procedure nor permits the permanent elimination of a notification requirement.
111. U.S. v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572 (D.N.J. 2001).
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home and place a logger on his computer if, at the same time, it
had been obliged to notify Scarfo that it had done so.'
This common law use of delayed notification has been approved
by the courts. Over 20 years ago, the Supreme Court held that the
Fourth Amendment does not require law enforcement to give im-
mediate notice of the execution of a search warrant. The Court
emphasized "that covert entries are constitutional in some circum-
stances, at least if they are made pursuant to a warrant." In fact,
the Court stated that an argument to the contrary was "frivo-
lous."" '3 In an earlier case - the seminal case defining the scope of
privacy in contemporary America - the Court said, "officers need
not announce their purpose before conducting an otherwise [duly]
authorized search if such an announcement would provoke the
escape of the suspect or the destruction of critical evidence." 114
Section 213 of the Patriot Act thus attempts to codify the com-
mon law authority that law enforcement had already had for dec-
ades. "Because of differences between jurisdictions, the law was a
mix of inconsistent standards that varied across the country. This
lack of uniformity hindered complex terrorism cases. Section 213
resolved the problem by establishing a uniform statutory stan-
dard.""' Now, under section 213, courts can delay notice if there is
"reasonable cause" to believe that immediate notification may
have a specified adverse result. The "reasonable cause" standard
is consistent with pre-PATRIOT Act case law for delayed notice of
warrants."6 And the law goes further, defining "reasonable cause"
for the issuance of a court order narrowly. Courts are, under sec-
tion 213, authorized to delay notice only when immediate notifica-
tion may result in death or physical harm to an individual, flight
from prosecution, evidence tampering, witness intimidation, or
otherwise seriously jeopardize an investigation."7
112. The same, of course, is true of any surreptitious use of listening devices. It would
have done little good for the FBI to secure a warrant to enter John Gotti's eating club in
Brooklyn to place a recording device in the facility if it had been obliged, at the same time,
to politely let Gotti know that he needed to speak clearly into the chandelier, as that was
where the bug had been placed.
113. Dalia v. U.S., 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
114. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
115. Dept. of Justice, supra note 93, at 11.
116. See, e.g., U.S. v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1337 (2d Cir. 1990) (government must
show "good reason" for delayed notice of warrants).
117. Section 213 cross-references and adopts the standards used to authorize delayed
notification of a wiretap or other electronic interception of communication. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2705(a)(2). Some critics say that this final catch-all phrase is too broad and provides for
too much leeway for Executive action. See SAFE Act, S.1709 (108th Cong.) § 3(a)(1)(A)
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In short, section 213 is really no change at all - it merely clari-
fies that a single uniform standard applies and that terrorist of-
fenses are included. Nor does Section 213 promise great abuse.
Here, as in the past under common law, the officer seeking author-
ity for delayed entry must get authorization for that action from a
federal judge or magistrate - under the exact same standards and
procedures as they would need to do so to get a warrant to enter a
building in the first place. And the law makes clear that in all
cases law enforcement must ultimately give notice that property
has been searched or seized - the only difference from a tradi-
tional search warrant is the temporary delay in providing notifica-
tion. Here, too, then the presence of oversight rules seems strong
- certainly strong enough to prevent against the abuse that some
critics fear.1 '
Nor can it be doubted that the delayed notification have per-
formed a useful function and are a critical aspect of the strategy of
prevention - detecting and incapacitating terrorists before they
are able to strike. One example of the use of delayed notification
involves the indictment of Dr. Rafil Dhafir. A delayed notification
warrant allowed the surreptitious search of an airmail envelope
containing records of overseas bank accounts used to ship over $4
million to Iraq. Because Dhafir did not know of the search, he was
unable to flee and he did not move the funds before they were
seized."9 In another instance, the Department described a hypo-
thetical (based upon an actual case) in which the FBI secured ac-
cess to the hard drive of terrorists who had sent their computer for
(proposing to eliminate catch-all clause and "intimidation of potential witnesses" as
grounds for delayed notification). In the main, this concern seems overly cautious - one can
imagine few circumstances in which an investigation would be "seriously jeopardized" that
would not also satisfy one of the more specific listings of potential adverse consequences
that seem, undoubtedly, to be appropriate grounds for delay. But more problematically, in
making that argument critics must accept, implicitly, the converse proposition - that there
are circumstances in which an Article III judge would find that an investigation would be
seriously jeopardized but in which they would not accept a delay in notification. In other
words, they value the process of notification more highly than the substance of an impaired
investigation - a result that seems to reverse the more reasonable evaluation of the com-
parative values, especially when the result is validated by an independent Federal judge.
118. The Department of Justice has reported to Congress that the most common period
of delay has been 7 days. Delays as short as 1 day or as long as 90 have been authorized.
On occasion, courts have permitted delays for an unspecified period of time lasting until an
indictment was unsealed. See Letter, Janice E. Brown, Act'g Asst. Atty. Gen. to Hon.
James Sensenbrener, Chrmn. House Jud. Comm., Attachment at 10 (May 12, 2003).
119. See Letter, William E. Moscella, Asst. Atty. Gen. to Hon. Dennis Hastert, Speaker,
at 3 (July 25, 2003); see also AP, Four Indicted for Sending Funds to Iraq, HoUs. CHRON.,




repair. In still another, they planted a bug in a terrorists' safe
house. °
Finally, opposition to Section 213 seems to misunderstand the
true nature of the Type I error involved. The purpose of the notice
requirement is two-fold: 1) In typical searches it allows a con-
temporaneous objection. The individual may say, in effect, "you've
got the wrong house;" 2) Following notification it also allows for
non-contemporaneous objections to be heard in court - so that
overzealous execution of the warrant, or a search beyond the scope
authorized may be challenged before a judge.
But in the context of a surreptitious entry and delayed notifica-
tion, the first of those purposes can have no force. Except by acci-
dent law enforcement or intelligence agents will not conduct a de-
layed notice entry in a manner that affords contemporaneous noti-
fication - to do so would frustrate the precise purpose of the de-
layed notification. So the only way to effectuate the first of these
two purposes is to prohibit delayed notification entry altogether, a
rule that would have very significant costs. And it is equally clear
that the second purpose - allowing subsequent challenge in court
- is served so long as the law requires (as Section 213 does) even-
tual notification in all circumstances. The only real argument
that critics can make is that Section 213 imposes costs by virtue of
the time for which the notification is delayed - a true cost but a
comparatively minor one when balanced against the substantial
benefits that the process of delayed notification allows.
The evident utility of the potential uses of Section 213, the pro-
vision for subsequent review in court, and the absolute absence of
any evidence of abuse of this power, suggest that several proposed
repeals under Congressional consideration are unwise.'21  At
worst, they would completely eliminate a long-standing investiga-
tive tool for all crimes - both terrorist crimes, and traditional
common law crimes. At best, the rejection of Section 213 would
reinstitute a dichotomy between traditional crimes and terrorist
investigations - again, a mistaken one that oddly provides greater
authority to investigate less threatening common law criminal
acts.
120. See Moscella, supra note 119, at 4.
121. These proposals include, e.g., S. 1709 (108th Cong.) (introduced by Sen. Craig (R-
ID) and Sen. Durbin (D-IL)) (proposing substantial curtailment of the Patriot Act); S. 1552
(108th Cong.) (introduced by Sen. Murkowski (R-AK)) (same); H. Amdt. 292 to H.R. 2799




This reaction to Section 213 does, however, highlight one sig-
nificant aspect of the changing nature of the public debate con-
cerning civil liberties - the greater awareness of issues relating to
governmental authority that the events of September 11th have
engendered in the general public. The common law authority to
delay notification has existed for more than 20 years. It took the
events of September 11th to make the public generally aware of
that authority. And that is a good thing - for though some might
disagree on whether such authority is necessary, few can disagree
that an intelligent and thoughtful debate about the utility of such
authority amongst the public and its elected representatives bene-
fits everybody.
D. Threats To Protected First Amendment Advocacy
In at least two ways, aspects of the Executive response to terror
have directly raised the specter of a potential threat to core First
Amendment advocacy - opposition, for example, to the Admini-
stration's policy regarding Iraq, or globalization of the economy.
Unlike the two aspects of the Patriot Act already discussed (where
the costs of Type II errors are high, and the relative risk of Type I
errors minimal), here the costs of a Type I error are higher. The
fundamental right to openly criticize the government is a broad
public right, held by all in common. As such, we should be espe-
cially careful before allowing new policies to trench upon that
right.
1. FBI Revised Investigative Guidelines
Consider, first, certain new FBI investigative guidelines.'22
These new guidelines, announced by the Attorney General in May
2002,123 authorize FBI agents to open up anti-terror investigations
122. These guidelines were, as the text makes clear, of purely executive character, re-
versing earlier executive orders originally promulgated in the 1970's. The most recent re-
issuance prior to 2001 was in November of 1995. See Advice to FBI Regarding Domestic
Security/Terrorism Investigations and Preliminary Inquires (Nov. 21, 1995). As executive
orders, they have no formal relationship to the Patriot Act. Yet, concern over the "FBI
invading mosques" is one of the perpetual criticisms of the Patriot Act - reflecting the pub-
lic's broader conception of the Act than the reality of its parameters. As such, it seems
appropriate to address the issue in this paper which deals with the broad context of civil
liberty and the necessities of anti-terrorism investigations.
123. See The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise
and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations, May 2002, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf.
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whenever information warrants. They have stirred controversy,
at least in part, because the guidelines now allow FBI agents con-
ducting such investigations to do so in any public forum - in effect,
allowing agents to attend anti-war rallies or prayer at mosques in
order to discern whether the line between permissible First
Amendment advocacy and impermissible advocacy of specific vio-
lent acts has been crossed.
American policy has a historic, long-standing tolerance for dis-
sent - even dissent that advocates change in the government.124
As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote: "The best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market .... [W]e should be eternally vigilant against at-
tempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and be-
lieve to be fraught with death."25 Thus, in 1969, the Supreme
Court made clear that the law may not "forbid or proscribe advo-
cacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advo-
cacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless ac-
tion."126 In the light of terrorism threats, investigative practices to
examine whether speech crosses that line from theoretical to im-
minent are perfectly reasonable and understandable - but if ad-
vanced too forcefully, they run the substantial risk of chilling pro-
tected speech.
There are, therefore, aspects of the FBI's guidelines that sug-
gest the need for heightened sensitivity to the potential for an in-
fringement on protected constitutional liberties. To be sure, the
FBI guidelines raise no Fourth Amendment concerns, insofar as
they authorize the FBI to collect publicly available information
from public databases and/or public meetings - that information is
not protected under the privacy doctrines that follow from Katz.
Nonetheless, the FBI guidelines do implicate potential threats
to at least two fundamental liberty interests guaranteed by the
Constitution. Most obviously, the Supreme Court has long recog-
nized a freedom of political association and the threat to that free-
124. But see McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003) (allowing restric-
tions on political speech to combat appearance of corruption).
125, Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
126. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (emphasis added); see also NAACP
v. Clairborne Hardware, Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (approving peaceful boycott). One caveat
to this analysis is in order - in Brandenburg, and in earlier cases applying the "clear and
present danger" doctrine, the actual threat of violence was "puny." See Brandenburg, 395
U.S. at 454 (Douglas, J. concurring). Whatever one thinks of the terrorist threat, there can
be little argument that it is not as minimal as those "threats" previously addressed by the
Court.
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dom posed by requiring organizations to identify their members. 127
Second, many of the indicators that might be used to identify po-
tential subjects of a terrorist investigation are also indicators that,
in other circumstances, are potentially the products of protected
First Amendment activity; in other words, though FBI investiga-
tive techniques are not intended to impinge upon free political
speech or association, they may have the collateral effect of doing
SO.
Thus, there is a significant risk that a mal-administered system
will impinge upon fundamental constitutional liberties. This does
not mean that the risk of such impingement means abandonment
of the program - especially not in light of the potentially disas-
trous consequences of another terrorist attack in the United
States. However, fairly stringent steps are necessary to provide
the requisite safeguards for minimizing inadvertent or abusive
infringements of civil liberty in the first instance and correcting
them as expeditiously as possible. Those steps would include
some or all of the following:
* The FBI's use of these new investigative guidelines
should be subject to extensive, continuous Congressional
oversight. This should include more than the mere re-
porting of raw data and numbers - at least as a spot
check, Congress should examine individual, closed cases
(if necessary using confidential procedures to maintain
classified status) to assure itself that the investigative
guidelines are not being misused. In other words, the da-
tabase contemplated by the FBI guidelines should, under
limited circumstances, be subject to congressional scru-
tiny;
e Authorization for "criminal intelligence" investigations
under the FBI's guidelines should, in all circumstances,
be in writing such that the FBI's internal system creates
an "audit trail" for the authorization of investigations
with potential First Amendment implications. Only
through detailed record keeping can the use and/or abuse
of investigative authority be reviewed;
127. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (defining freedom of association).
704 Vol. 42
Summer 2004
* The FBI's new guidelines generally authorize the use of
all lawful investigative techniques for both "general
crimes" investigations and "criminal intelligence" investi-
gations. There should be a special hesitancy, however, in
using the undisclosed participation of an undercover
agent or cooperating private individual to examine the
conduct of organizations that are exercising core First
Amendment rights. When an organization is avowedly
political in nature (giving that phrase the broadest defini-
tion reasonable) and has as its sole mission the advocacy
of a viewpoint or belief, we should be especially leery of
ascribing to that organization criminal intent, absent
compelling evidence to that effect.
* There should, as well, be a hesitancy in visiting public
places and events that are clearly intended to involve the
exercise of core First Amendment rights, as the presence
of official observers may chill expression. This is not to
say that no such activity should ever be permitted - it is,
however, to suggest the need for supervisory authoriza-
tion and careful review before and after the steps are
taken. Conversely, existing court consent decrees that
expressly prohibit all such activity (as is currently the
case in New York City) 28 should be revisited.
* No American should be the subject of a criminal inves-
tigation solely on the basis of his exercise of a Constitu-
tionally protected right to dissent. An indication of
threat sufficient to warrant investigation should always
be based upon significant intelligence suggesting actual
criminal or terrorist behavior.
Finally, although the FBI's guidelines authorize preliminary in-
quiries through the use of public information resources, many
Americans fear that these inquiries will result in the creation of
personalized dossiers on dissenters. As it appears now, there are
no explicit provisions in the guidelines for the destruction of re-
cords from preliminary inquiries that produce no evidence suffi-
cient to warrant a full-scale investigation. One possible amend-
ment to the guidelines that would ameliorate many privacy con-
128. See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 787
F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1985).
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cerns would be an explicit provision providing for such destruction
or, archiving with limited retrieval authority.
One other brief point should be made about privacy - one al-
ready made in the general discussion earlier. The FBI guidelines
are not exclusively an impingement on privacy. Rather, they act
by substituting one privacy intrusion (into certain public spheres)
for other privacy intrusions (into more private spheres, perhaps
through other investigative means). It may also substitute for
increased random investigations or the invidious use of racial, na-
tional origin, or religious classifications. Here, one cannot make
broad value judgments - as noted, each person weighs the utility
of their own privacy by a different metric. But we should ac-
knowledge that for some Americans, the price of a little less public
privacy might not be too great if it resulted in a little more per-
sonal privacy.
2. "Material Support" For Terrorism
A second potential area in which the Patriot Act might be seen
to impinge on First Amendment freedoms lies in the prohibition
against providing material support to terrorist organizations.
129
Some organizations have humanitarian aspects to their work and
say that their humanitarian efforts are distinct from the allegedly
129. Some raise yet another concern in the definition of "domestic" terrorism, added to
the law by Section 802 of the Patriot Act. Some critics claim that this amendment "ex-
pands terrorism laws to include 'domestic terrorism' which could subject political organiza-
tions to surveillance, wiretapping, harassment, and criminal action for political advocacy."
They also claim that it includes a "provision that might allow the actions of peaceful groups
that dissent from government policy, such as Greenpeace, to be treated as 'domestic terror-
ism.'" See Stuart Taylor in UnPATRIOTic, NAT'L J., Aug. 4, 2003 (quoting ACLU fundrais-
ing letter); see also ACLU, The USA Patriot Act and Government Actions that Threaten Our
Civil Liberties (undated). These fears are exacerbated by some government actions - there
is, for example, a pending criminal charge against Greenpeace for boarding ships coming
into American ports as a means of protest. See United States v. Greenpeace, Inc., Indict-
ment (M.D. Fla No. 03-20577) (charging violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2279); see also U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Greenpeace Charged with Conspiracy to Unlawfully Board Cargo Vessel, July 18,
2003, available at http'/www.usdoj.gov/usao/fls/greenpeace.html. § 2279 proscribes, inter
alia, "go[ing] on board any vessel. . . before her actual arrival" and was intended to prevent
prostitutes and pimps from boarding arriving merchant ships.
These charges are, of course, independent of the Patriot Act, but they do lend cre-
dence to fears expressed about the potential to use the Patriot Act to suppress dissent.
Insofar, however, as the Patriot Act itself is concerned, these fears are not well-grounded.
The Patriot Act limits the definition of "domestic terrorism" in a way that protects political
protest. Under § 802 of the Patriot Act, the definition of "domestic terrorism" is limited to
conduct that (1) violates federal or state criminal law and (2) is dangerous to human life.
Peaceful groups that dissent from government policy without breaking laws cannot be
investigated.
terrorist acts of related organizations. They thus argue that it
impinges on First Amendment freedoms of speech and association
for supporters to be criminally prosecuted when all they are doing
is providing material support to the humanitarian aspects of the
organization. The Executive responds, not unreasonably, that
money is fungible and that contributions to the humanitarian as-
pects of the organization are readily "passed through" to the ter-
rorist arms of related organizations. 0 We thus face the difficult
conundrum of distinguishing between conduct aimed to support
legitimate political and humanitarian groups and conduct that is a
mere subterfuge for supporting terrorist organizations.
It must, first, be acknowledged that much of the ambiguity in
the statute pre-dates the Patriot Act itself. It was an earlier stat-
ute, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
that gave the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to designate
terrorist organizations, and made it a crime to provide material
support to organizations so designated.' The Patriot Act, in Sec-
tion 810, enhanced the criminal penalties and also, in Section 805,
expanded the scope of the statute - making clear that it applied to
those who provided expert assistance to terrorist organizations;
applied to acts outside the United States; expanded the list of ter-
rorism crimes for which it is illegal to provide material support;
and clarified that material support includes all types of monetary
instruments.
The question remains - what must the government prove the
supporter knew in order for the supporter to violate the criminal
prohibition? The statute states that "[w]hoever . ..knowingly
provides material support to a foreign terrorist organization" is
guilty of a crime.' 2 Does it suffice to show that the supporter pur-
posefully did the act which constitutes the offense - i.e. that he
provided material support by donating money to the organization,
or must government also show that the supporter knew of the or-
ganization's designation as a terrorist organization or of the
unlawful activities that caused it to be so designated?'33
130. Nor is the concern limited to the Executive Branch. The Senate Finance Commit-
tee has begun an investigation of certain charities, believing them to be fronts for A-Qaeda
fundraising. See Dan Eggen & John Mintz, Muslim Groups' IRS Files Sought, WASH. POST,
Jan. 14, 2004, at Al.
131. See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-31, 110
Stat. 1214, §§ 302, 303 (codified at 8 USC § 1189 and 18 USC § 2339B).
132. 18 USC § 2399B.
133. Humanitarian Law Project v. Dep't of Justice, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Here, the Government's position - that it need not prove knowl-
edge of the designation - goes too far and risks trenching on First
Amendment freedoms of speech and association.' The require-
ment that a crime involve culpable purposeful intent has a solid
historical grounding. As Justice Robert Jackson wrote:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only
when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient no-
tion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of
law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent
ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between
good and evil. A relation between some mental element and
punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the
child's familiar exculpatory "But I didn't mean to," and has af-
forded the rational basis for a tardy and unfinished substitu-
tion of deterrence and reformation in place of retaliation and
vengeance as the motivation for public prosecution. Unquali-
fied acceptance of this doctrine by English common law was
indicated by Blackstone's sweeping statement that to consti-
tute any crime there must first be a "vicious will." 3'
Though the text of Section 2339B requires that the supporters
have acted "knowingly" - a seeming protection from the imposition
of unwarranted liability - if interpreted as the government sug-
gests, that requirement would be but a parchment barrier to what
is, in effect, the imposition of absolute liability. The government's
interpretation would presume that all supporters are charged with
knowing all of the intricate regulatory arcana that govern the des-
ignation by the Secretary of terrorist organizations - a presump-
tion that generally applies (and perhaps misapplies) in the context
of a closely regulated industry.136 As a consequence, under the
Government's interpretation, the only requirement imposed by
requiring proof that one has acted "knowingly" is that the gov-
ernment must demonstrate that the defendant has purposefully
134. For a general discussion of the problem of overly broad criminal laws and the in-
creased criminalization of otherwise innocent conduct, see Paul Rosenzweig, The Over-
Criminalization of Social and Economic Conduct, LEGAL MEMORANDUM No. 7 (The Heri-
tage Foundation, Apr. 2003).
135. Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952).
136. E.g., U.S. v. Int'l Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971) ("[W]here...
dangerous or deleterious materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great
that anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them must be
presumed to be aware of the regulation.").
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done the act constituting the offense - and in the context of a
charitable donation that showing is trivial. Nobody donates by
mistake or accident. As Justice Potter Stewart noted: "As a prac-
tical matter, therefore, they [would be] under a species of absolute
liability for violation of the regulations despite the 'knowingly' re-
quirement.""3 7
What is particularly disturbing about the Government's argu-
ment is that it works in tandem with the statutory amendment
authorizing significantly harsher penalties. Historically, when
the courts first considered laws containing reduced intent re-
quirements, the laws almost uniformly provided for very light
penalties such as a fine or a short jail term, not imprisonment in a
penitentiary."3 8 As commentators noted, modest penalties are a
logical complement to crimes that do not require specific intent. 9
Indeed, some courts questioned whether any imprisonment at all
could be imposed in the absence of intent and culpability.4 ' This
historical view has, of course, been lost: laws with reduced mens
rea requirements are often now felonies.' And even misdemeanor
offenses can, through the stacking of sentences, result in substan-
tial terms of incarceration."4
But this should not be the uniform case - especially where, as
here, much innocent conduct, otherwise protected by the First
Amendment, would be swept up in the broader definition. We
should not lose sight of a fundamental truth: "If we use prison to
achieve social goals regardless of the moral innocence of those we
incarcerate, then imprisonment loses its moral opprobrium and
our criminal law becomes morally arbitrary."' Or as the drafters
of the Model Penal Code said:
137. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. at 569 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
138. See Staples v. U.S., 511 U.S. 600, 616 (1994) (citing, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ray-
mond, 97 Mass. 567 (1867) (fine up to $200 or 6 months in jail); Commonwealth v. Farren,
91 Mass. 489 (1864) (fine only); People v. Snowburger, 71 N.W. 497 (1897) (fine up to $500
or incarceration in county jail)).
139. See Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 70 (1933); see
also Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256 ("[P]enalties commonly are relatively small, and conviction
does no grave damage to an offender's reputation").
140. E.g. People ex rel. Price v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker, Co., 121 N.E. 474, 477
(1918) (Cardozo, J.); id. at 478 (Crane, J., concurring) (imprisonment for crime that re-
quires no mens rea stretches law of regulatory offenses beyond its limitations).
141. E.g., U.S. v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1994) (felony violation of Clean
Water Act; no knowledge of regulations necessary).
142. E.g., U.S. v. Ming Hong, 242 F.3d 528 (4th Cir. 2001) (misdemeanor convictions
stacked for 3 year sentence).




It has been argued, and the argument undoubtedly will be re-
peated, that strict liability is necessary for enforcement in a
number of the areas where it obtains. But if practical en-
forcement precludes litigation of the culpability of alleged de-
viation from legal requirements, the enforcers cannot rightly
demand the use of penal sanctions for the purpose. Crime
does and should mean condemnation, and no court should
have to pass that judgment unless it can declare that the de-
fendant's act was culpable. This is too fundamental to be com-
promised.'"
The broad statutory language, which does not make clear what
intent must be proven has, fortunately, begun to be interpreted by
the courts in a restrictive manner.'45 And that's a good thing - it
demonstrates again that we can grant the government additional
powers to combat terrorism while reasonably anticipating that the
checking mechanisms in place will restrain too excessive a use of
those powers.
E. Information Technology - The Next Challenge
Much of the foregoing discussion has focused on the primary
fear that critics have - the fear of enhanced executive authority
and the potential for abuse. As noted at the outset, however,
there is a second aspect to the critique offered by opponents of new
executive authority - concern that advances in information tech-
nology will unreasonably erode the privacy and anonymity to
which American citizens are entitled. They fear, in effect, the
creation of an "electronic dossier" on every American. While por-
tions of the Patriot Act tangentially raise those fears,'46 the pre-
144. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 and Comments at 282-83 (1985).
145. Humanitarian Law Project, 352 F.3d at 394-403. The Court also held that the
terms "personnel" and "training" were impermissibly vague. Id. at 403-05. On remand, the
district court likewise held that the phrase "expert advice" was impermissibly vague. See
Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 2004 WL 112760 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2004) (as re-
ported in Eric Lichtblau, Citing Free Speech, Judge Voids Part of Antiterror Act, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 27, 2004, at Al). Unlike the conclusions regarding intent, these decisions
(which purport to find vagueness in words of common usage) are highly suspect and, given
the interpretation of intent adopted, unnecessary.
146. Some are concerned, for example, with the provisions of Section 216, which amends
the pen register/trap and trace statute to clarify that it applies to internet communications,
and to allow for a single order that is valid across the country. But for years, law enforce-
ment has used pen registers to track which numbers a particular telephone dials. See 18
U.S.C. § 3123. Section 216 again simply updates the law to the technology. It "ensures
that law enforcement will be able to collect non-content information about terrorists' com-
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dominant area in which they arise lies in information gathering
programs being developed outside the four corners of the text of
the Patriot Act.
Initially, these concerns first arose in the context of a research
program know as Terrorism Information Awareness (TIA).'
4 7
Those concerns have since led Congress to kill the research fund-
ing for the proposal. With the end of the TIA program, attention
has now turned to the Transportation Security Administration's
proposal to use an enhanced information technology program to
screen airplane passengers. That program, known as CAPPS II,
would effectively conduct a computerized screen of every passen-
ger to assess his or her potential threat as a terrorist.
4 9
1. CAPPS II - The System
Since September 11th, the aviation industry has undergone
many changes to strengthen airport security. The TSA was cre-
ated and placed in charge of passenger and baggage screeners
(who are now federal employees). It has been using explosives
detection systems on 90 percent of checked baggage and substan-
tially expanded the Federal Air Marshal Service. However, little
has been done to determine whether a person seeking to board an
aircraft belongs to a terrorist organization or otherwise poses a
threat. In order to meet this objective, the Transportation Secu-
rity Administration is developing the Computer Assisted Passen-
ger Prescreening System II (CAPPS II).
munications regardless of the media they use." Dept. of Justice, supra note 93, at 17.
Under long-settled Supreme Court precedent, the use of pen registers does not constitute a
.search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. As such, law enforcement need not
obtain court approval before installing a pen register. This is so because "a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties,"
and "when he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the
telephone company." Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979). There is little good
reason not to apply the same reasoning to internet addresses in the "Send" line of an e-
mail.
147. For a detailed discussion of TIA, how it might have worked, and what appropriate
legal mechanisms for its control might have been, see Paul Rosenzweig, Proposals for Im-
plementing the Terrorism Information Awareness System, LEGAL MEMORANDUM No. 8 (The
Heritage Foundation, Aug. 2003), reprinted in GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL. (2004) (forthcoming);
Taipale, supra note 35.
148. S. Amdt. 59 to H.J. Res. 2, Pub. L. No. 108-7 (prohibiting funding for TIA); see also
Paul Rosenzweig, Michael Scardaville & Ha Nguyen, Senate Should Restore TIA Funding,
WEB MEMO No. 315, (The Heritage Foundation, July 2003).
149. This summary of CAPPS II is derived from Paul Rosenzweig & Ha Nyguen, CAPPS
II Should be Tested and Deployed, BACKGROUNDER No. 1683 (The Heritage Foundation,
Aug. 2003).
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Most of the changes made in airport security have focused on
looking for potential weapons (better examination of luggage,
more alert screeners) and creating obstacles to the use of a
weapon on an aircraft (reinforced cockpit doors, armed pilots, etc).
A computer-aided system would improve the TSA's ability to as-
sess the risk a passenger may pose to air safety.
The current, limited CAPPS was first deployed in 1996 by
Northwest Airlines. Other airlines began to use CAPPS in 1998,
as recommended by the White House Commission on Aviation
Safety and Security (also known as the Gore Commission).5 In
1999, responding to public criticism, the FAA limited the use of
CAPPS to checked luggage screening. In other words, since 1999,
CAPPS information has not been used as a basis for subjecting
passengers to personal searches and questioning. As a conse-
quence, even if CAPPS flagged a high-risk passenger, he could not
be singled out for more intensive searches.
After September 11th, CAPPS returned to its original concep-
tion and is now again used to screen all passengers along with
their carry-on and checked luggage. However, the criteria used to
select passengers, such as last-minute reservations, cash payment,
and short trips are over inclusive. They can flag up to 50% of pas-
sengers in some instances, many in short haul markets.' Nor
does CAPPS attempt to determine whether or not the federal gov-
ernment has information that may connect a specific perspective
passenger with terrorism or criminal activity that may indicate
they are a threat to the flight. As a result, it's likely that if Osama
bin Laden tried to board a plane today, CAPPS would not identify
him for arrest or further inspection.'
The Transportation Security Agency (TSA) believes that screen-
ing what a passenger is carrying is only part of the equation and is
developing CAPPS II as a successor to CAPPS in order to deter-
150. See White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, Feb. 12, 1997,
available at http//www.airportnet.org/depts/regulatory/gorefinal.htm.
151. See Robert W. Poole, Jr. & George Passatino, A Risk-Based Airport Security Policy,
REASON PUB. POL'Y INST., May 2003, at 11.
152. It has been reported that the CAPPS I system was partially effective, flagging nine
of the 19 September 11th terrorists for additional screening. See National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The Aviation Security System and the 9/11
Attacks: Staff Statement No. 3, Jan. 27, 2004, available at http://www.9-
llcommission.gov/hearings/hearing7/ staffstatement3.pdf; see also Sara Goo & Dan Eg-
gen, 9/11 Hijackers Used Mace and Knives, Panel Reports, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2004, at
Al (summarizing report). To the extent that is true, it emphasizes both that some form of
screening can be effective and that however effective it might be, the human element will
always be a factor in insuring the success of any system.
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mine whether the individual poses a threat to aviation security.
CAPPS II will use government intelligence and law enforcement
information in order to assign risk levels to passengers based on
real information not arbitrary models. The TSA will then be able
to devote more of its resources to those with a higher score (indi-
cating they pose a greater risk), than those deemed to be a lesser
concern (although some degree of randomness will need to be re-
tained).
In January 2003, TSA released a Privacy Act notice for CAPPS
II, the successor to CAPPS.153 Since then, many critics have raised
substantial concerns. Some thought that CAPPS II was too broad
in scope and could infringe on passengers' privacy. Others were
concerned that the government should not rely on potentially
flawed commercial data to prevent individuals from traveling by
air. Some asserted that the use of knowledge discovery technolo-
gies on a wide variety of personal data could pose privacy and civil
liberty violations. Finally, many wondered if individuals would be
able to challenge their score.
TSA has recently made available an Interim Final Privacy No-
tice on CAPPS II, which includes substantial modifications to the
initial proposal based on many of the concerns voiced in response
to the first Privacy Notice. 54
Under the Interim Notice, TSA will not keep any significant
amount of information after the completion of a passenger's itin-
erary. Furthermore, TSA anticipates that it will delete all records
of travel for U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents a cer-
tain number of days after the safe completion of the passenger's
travels (7 days is the current anticipation). TSA has also commit-
ted to developing a mechanism by which a passenger targeted for
more thorough screening can seek to set the record straight if they
think they have been identified in error.
More importantly, the CAPPS II system has addressed privacy
concerns by severely limiting the types of private commercial data
that will be examined. The proposed CAPPS II system will access
only a "passenger name record" (PNR), which will include infor-
mation collected at the time the passenger makes the reserva-
tions, prior to the flight. Selected PNR information will be trans-
mitted to commercial data providers for the sole purpose of au-
thenticating the passenger's identity. This process is similar to the
153. See 68 Fed. Reg. 2101 (Jan. 15, 2003).
154. See 68 Fed. Reg. 45265 (Aug. 1, 2003).
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credit card application procedure used to check for fraudulent in-
formation. Commercial data providers will then transmit back to
TSA a numeric score indicating the degree of match between
commercial data and TSA data, giving TSA a good idea if the per-
son is who they say they are.'55 No commercial data will be re-
tained by the TSA and no travel data will be retained by the com-
mercial companies.
After the authentication phase, the CAPPS II system will con-
duct a risk assessment by comparing that identification informa-
tion to intelligence and law enforcement data. Passengers whose
identity is confirmed with a high degree of confidence and have no
matches with intelligence or law enforcement data will be less
likely to receive additional scrutiny, whereas those on the opposite
end of the spectrum will likely be searched more thoroughly or
arrested as appropriate. This will allow TSA to focus its preven-
tion resources on those passengers who, through a qualitative
analysis, are determined to be more dangerous.'
2. Assessing The Risks of Type I and Type II Errors
The CAPPS II program poses some interesting and challenging
problems in adapting the law to new technology and the realities
of new technology to the law.'57 First, if CAPPS II is to be effec-
tive, its hallmark will be the idea that some form of "result" will
necessarily be immediately available to TSA screeners on a "real-
time" basis so that they can make near-instantaneous decisions
regarding whom to screen or not screen prior to allowing passen-
gers to board the aircraft. If CAPPS II were designed so that de-
tailed personal information on each passenger were transmitted to
every TSA screener, all would agree that the architecture of the
system would not adequately protect individual privacy. Thus,
the analysis passed by the CAPPS II system to TSA employees at
155. Absolute certainty of identification is impossible. In practice, all identification will
be expressed as a "confidence interval" reflecting an estimate of the degree of certainty in
an identification. For most travelers, this confidence interval will be quite high. For a few,
who will be subject to greater screening, it will not.
156. By all reports, the TSA intends to implement the CAPPS II system this year in one
form or another. See Sara Goo, U.S. to Push Airlines for Passenger Records, WASH. POST,
Jan. 12, 2004, at Al. Thus, the issues addressed in this paper are not at all theoretical.
157. This section is derived from earlier Congressional testimony. See Paul
Rosenzweig, Can The Use Of Factual Data Analysis Strengthen National Security?, Testi-
mony Before the United States House of Representatives, Committee on Government Re-
form, Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and
the Census (May 20, 2003).
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the airport must be limited to a reported color code - red, yellow or
green - and should not generally identify the basis for the assign-
ment of the code.
Thus, CAPPS II proposes to precisely reverse the privacy pro-
tection equation being developed in other contexts. To protect pri-
vacy, other information technology programs disaggregate analy-
sis from identity by making the data available to the analyst while
concealing the identity of the subject of the inquiry unless and un-
til disclosure is warranted. In the reverse of this paradigm,
CAPPS II will disclose the identity of the potential threat (through
a red/yellow/green system displayed to the screener, warning of a
particular individual) but will conceal from the screener the data
underlying the analysis - again, until such time as a determina-
tion is made that the two pieces of information should be com-
bined. The privacy protection built into CAPPS II is therefore the
mirror image of the more common system. It is by no means clear
which method of protecting privacy is ex ante preferable - but it is
clear that the two systems operate differently and if we are to
have any sort of CAPPS II system at all, it can only have privacy
protections of the second kind.
To reiterate a point made earlier, CAPPS II is not necessarily a
decrease in privacy. Rather, it requires trade-offs in different
types of privacy. It substitutes one privacy intrusion (into elec-
tronic data) for another privacy intrusion (the physical intrusive-
ness of body searches at airports). And it may have the salutary
effect of reducing the need for random searches and eliminate the
temptation for screeners to use objectionable characteristics of
race, religion, or national origin as a proxy for threat indicators.158
For many Americans, the price of a little less electronic privacy
might not be too great if it resulted in a little more physical pri-
vacy, fewer random searches, and a reduction in invidious racial
profiling.
Finally, the unique subject matter of the CAPPS II system calls
for heightened sensitivity to the potential for an infringement on
158. Some purely random searches will need to be maintained in order to maintain
inspection system and defeat so-called "Carnival Booth" attacks (named after a student
algorithm proposing a method of defeating CAPPS). Adding a random factor to the inspec-
tion regime answers the problem. See Samidh Chakrabati & Aaron Strauss, Carnival
Booth: An Algorithm for Defeating the Computer-assisted Passenger Screening, available at
http://www.swiss.ai.mit.eud/6805/student-papers/springO2-papers/caps.htm (describing
program); Taipale, supra note 35, at n.281 (explaining how addition of random screening
guards against such attacks).
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protected constitutional liberties. While the Constitution affords
no additional protection to information that an individual has
made available to other individuals or institutions, CAPPS II im-
plicates at least two fundamental liberty interests guaranteed by
the Constitution. Most obviously, since the 1960's, the Supreme
Court has recognized a fundamental right to travel'59 - indeed, one
might reasonably say that one significant purpose of the Federal
union was to insure the freedom of commerce and travel within
the United States. Second, like the FBI Guidelines discussed ear-
lier, many of the indicators that might be used to identify poten-
tial terrorists are also indicators that, in other circumstances, are
potentially the products of protected First Amendment activity -
in other words, though CAPPS II is not intended to impinge upon
free political speech, it may collaterally do so.
Thus, there is a significant risk that a poorly designed system
will impinge upon fundamental constitutional liberties. The risk
of such impingement should not result in abandonment of the pro-
gram - especially not in light of the potentially disastrous conse-
quences of Type II error, another terrorist attack in the United
States. However, as with the FBI Guidelines, we will need strin-
gent oversight to provide the requisite safeguards for minimizing
inadvertent infringements of civil liberty in the first instance and
correcting them as expeditiously as possible.
CAPPS II is therefore a paradigm for answering the question of
whether or not we can conceive of a suitable oversight mechanism
that would appropriately constrain executive authority while al-
lowing its application to circumstances we consider necessary. As
with the FBI guidelines, the use of CAPPS II should be subject to
significant Congressional oversight, again including spot checks
(in a classified means, if necessary) to insure that the CAPPS II
methodology is not being misused. Though the details would
need, of course, to be further developed, the outline of such an
oversight system might include some or all of the following com-
ponents:
* CAPPS II should be constructed to include an audit
trail so that its use and/or abuse can be reviewed;
* It should not be expanded beyond its current use in
identifying suspected terrorists and threats to national
159. Shapiro v. Thompson, 398 U.S. 618 (1969).
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security - it should not be used as a means, for example,
of identifying drug couriers or deadbeat dads.6 ' Thus,
the pending proposal to screen for outstanding criminal
warrants should be rejected;
* The program should sunset after a fixed period of time,
thereby ensuring adequate Congressional review;
* CAPPS II should have significant civil and criminal
penalties for abuse.
* The "algorithm" used to screen for potential danger
must, necessarily, be maintained in secret, as its disclo-
sure would frustrate the purpose of CAPPS II. It must,
however, also be subject to appropriate congressional
scrutiny in a classified setting and, if necessary, inde-
pendent (possibly classified) technical scrutiny;
e An individual listed for additional screening or prohib-
ited from flying should be entitled to know the basis for
his or her listing and should have a mechanism for chal-
lenging the listing before a neutral arbiter or tribunal.
To the extent practicable, the review should be as prompt
as possible;
* Because commercial databases may be error-ridden, no
American should be totally denied a right to travel (i.e.
red-carded) and subject to likely arrest as a suspected
terrorist solely on the basis of public, commercial data.
An indication of threat sufficient to warrant denial of
that right should (except in extraordinarily compelling
circumstances) be based only upon significant intelligence
from non-commercial sources.
o The CAPPS II system should be designed so that the
No-Fly/Red Card designation, though initially made as
the product of a computer algorithm, is never transmitted
to the "retail" TSA screening system until it has been re-
viewed and approved by an official of sufficiently high au-
thority within TSA to insure accountability for the sys-
160. Cf. William Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2183, 2184 (use of
expanded surveillance authority to prosecute only terrorists and other serious offenses).
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tem.16' Nor is there any reason for the underlying data
ever to be transmitted to the TSA screener.
Finally, before full deployment, CAPPS II needs to demonstrate
its effectiveness. It holds great promise - but promise is far dif-
ferent from reality. Indeed, thoughtful critics have identified at
least one potentially significant hole in the proposed screening
system - it does not account for identity theft.6 ' Thus, while the
technology will allow the resolution of an identity - that is deter-
mining whether the identity is a false, created one or not - it can-
not resolve the theft of a true identity. Given the limited amount
of information being requested (name, address, date of birth, and
telephone number) it is quite likely that individuals could pose as
people other than themselves readily. It takes little more than a
few hours in a coffee shop, overhearing conversations, to make it
likely that enough information could be gathered to pose as some-
one else. And the only ways to enhance CAPPS II to fight this
prospect are to strengthen it -- either by collecting additional in-
formation about an individual or to return additional information
(for example, gender, height, weight and hair color) to the TSA
161. This would mirror the view of the European Union which styles it as a "right" to
have human checking of adverse automated decisions. The EU Directives may be found at
http://www.dataprivacy.ie/6aii-2.htm#15.
162. Other critics are more skeptical, characterizing CAPPS II as the search for a "silver
bullet" that cannot work because of Bayesian probability problems. E.g., ROSEN, supra
note 29, at 105-06. That broad statistical criticism is rejected by researchers in the field
who believe that because of the high correlation of data variables that are indicative of
terrorist activity, a sufficient number of variables can be used in any model to create rela-
tional inferences and substantially reduce the incidence of false positives. See Remarks,
David Jensen, Data Mining in the Private Sector, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, July 23, 2003; David Jensen, Matthew Rattigan, Hannah Bhiu, Information
Awareness: A Prospective Technical Assessment, SIGKDD '03 (Aug. 2003) (ACM 1-58113-
737-0/03/0008). To be sure, the ultimate efficacy of the technology developed is a vital
antecedent question. If the technology proves not to work-if, for example, it produces 95
percent false positives in a test environment-than all questions of implementation may be
moot. For no one favors deploying a new technology---especially one that threatens lib-
erty-if it is ineffective. It is important to recognize, however, that CAPPS II is a test pro-
ject - thus, we are unwise to reject it before knowing whether the effectiveness problem can
be solved. It is also important to realize that there may be potentially divergent definitions
of "effectiveness." Such a definition requires both an evaluation of the consequences of a
false positive and an evaluation of the consequences of failing to implement the technology.
If the consequences of a false positive are relatively modest (e.g. enhanced screening), and
if the mechanisms to correct false positives are robust (as recommended herein), then we
might accept a higher false positive rate precisely because the consequences of failing to
use CAPPS II technology (if it proves effective) could be so catastrophic. In other words, we
might accept 1,000 false positives if the only consequence is heightened surveillance and
the benefit gained is a 50 percent chance of preventing the next terrorist flight attack. The
vital research question, as yet unanswered, is the actual utility of the system and the pre-
cise probabilities of its error rates.
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screener so that the screener could confirm the identity of the in-
dividual before him or by requiring travelers to use some verified
token or identification with clearance incorporated in it." These
are neither technologically easy nor necessarily desirable results -
yet the conundrum of identity theft must be solved if CAPPS II is
to prove at all useful."M
On the whole, however, we should welcome the attempt to de-
velop CAPPS II technology. Enhanced technology allowing the
correlation of disparate databases and information has potentially
significant positive uses. American troops in Iraq, for example,
use the same sorts of link and pattern analysis, prediction algo-
rithms and enhanced database technology that would form a part
of CAPPS II (and formed a part of TIA) to successfully track the
guerrilla insurgency. '65
In short, the proposed system has, as noted, some significant
holes that need to be closed. But failing to make the effort to use
new technology wisely poses grave risks and is an irresponsible
abdication of responsibility. As six former top-ranking profession-
als in America's security services recently observed, we face two
problems-both a need for better analysis and, more critically,
"improved espionage, to provide the essential missing intelli-
163. See K A. Taipale, Identification Systems and Domestic Security: Who's Who in
Whoville, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Jan. 28, 2003, available at
http://www.stilwell.org/presentations/CAS-IDsystems-012804.pdf.
164. One could also take steps to harden identification cards to ensure they are less
readily falsifiable and more certainly government products. See Markle Foundation, Task
Force on National Security in the Information Age, App. A "Reliable Identification for
Homeland Protection and Collateral Gains" (Dec. 2003) (recommending hardened drivers
license identification). Such hardening will not, however, be of great utility unless we also
strengthen the authentication process to insure that those seeking identification are who
they say they are. Colorado's recent adoption of a biometric face identification mechanism
offers some promise of a technological solution to that question. See State of Colorado De-
ploys Facial Recognition Technology to Fight Identity Theft (Digimarc 2003) (on file with
author) (reporting detection of 20 attempted frauds per month through facial recognition
technology).
165. See AP, Computer-sleuthing aids troops in Iraq, Dec. 23, 2003. Any who doubt that,
in some form, enhanced information search technology can work need only contemplate the
recent arrest of LaShawn Pettus-Brown, whose date identified him as a fugitive when she
'Googled" him. See Dan Horn, Fugitive Done in by Savvy Date and Google, USA TODAY,
Jan. 29, 2004, available at httpJ/www.usatoday.com/technews/2004-01-29-google-
bust_x.htm. Compare that with the pre-September 11th prohibition (eliminated by the FBI
guidelines discussed, supra) on the FBI's use of Google. See L. Gordon Crovitz,
Info@FBI.gov, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2002. At some fundamental level, the ultimate ques-
tion is how to reconcile readily available technology in commercial and public use, with the
broad governmental monopoly on the authorized use of force. Whatever the proper resolu-
tion, we cannot achieve it by hiding our heads in the sand and pretending that data inte-
gration technology does not exist.
Patriot Act 719
Duquesne Law Review
gence." In their view, while there was "certainly a lack of dot-
connecting before September 11th," the more critical failure was
that "t]here were too few useful dots."66 CAPPS II technology
can help to answer both of these needs. Indeed, resistance to new
technology poses practical dangers. As the Congressional Joint
Inquiry into the events of September 11th pointed out, in noting
systemic failures that played a role in the inability to prevent the
terrorist attacks:
4. Finding: While technology remains one of this nation's
greatest advantages, it has not been fully and most effectively
applied in support of U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Persistent
problems in this area included a lack of collaboration between
Intelligence Community agencies [and] a reluctance to develop
and implement new technical capabilities aggressively .... 17
Or, as one commentator has noted, the reflexive opposition to
speculative research by some members of Congress and the public
is "downright un-American."" 8 It is an example of the "zero defect"
culture of punishing failures, not reason. Though CAPPS II tech-
nology might prove unavailing, the only certainty at this point is
that no one knows. It would be particularly unfortunate if Amer-
ica's elected leaders opposed basic scientific research without the
least sense that in doing so they demonstrate a "lack [ofi the es-
sential American willingness to take risks, to propose outlandish
ideas and, on occasion, to fail."6 9 That flaw is the way to stifle
bold and creative ideas-a "play it safe" mindset that, in the end,
is a disservice to American interests.
III. CONCLUSION
The Patriot Act has become something of a political football in
the past few months. One sees television commercials of anony-
166. Robert Bryant et al., America Needs More Spies, ECONOMIST, July 12, 2003, at 30.
167. Report of the Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
107th Cong., 2nd Sess., S. Rept. No. 107-351 and H. Rept. No. 107-792, Dec. 2002, p. xvi,
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_rpt/911rept.pdf (emphasis supplied). The
Joint Inquiry also critiqued the lack of adequate analytical tools, id. at Finding 5, and the
lack of a single means of coordinating disparate counterterrorism databases, id. at Find-
ings 9 & 10. Again, aspects of the CAPPS II program are intended to address these inade-
quacies and limitations on the research program are inconsistent with the Joint Inquiry's
findings.




mous hands ripping up the Constitution, with a voice-over blam-
ing Attorney General Ashcroft. Print ads show an elderly gentle-
man leaving a bookstore with text decrying the use of government
powers to get his book purchase list. But the hysteria is some-
what overblown.
Nobody would seriously dispute the major premise of Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's analysis - an analysis echoed by Judge Richard
Posner:" in assessing the appropriateness of infringements on
American liberty, we must take into account the severity of the
threat being averted. In this time of terror, some adjustment of
the balance between liberty and security is both necessary and
appropriate. And, as the courts are likely to agree, the Constitu-
tion is sufficiently malleable and pragmatic to accommodate this
balancing of interests. Indeed, the very text of the Fourth
Amendment - with its prohibition only of "unreasonable" searches
and seizures - explicitly recognizes the need to balance the harm
averted against the extent of governmental intrusion.
But in combating the increased threat to public safety, we must
take care not to systematically undervalue the countervailing lib-
erty interest.1 71 Our history suggests precisely why this risk ex-
ists: the insidious contraction of liberty results from measures
taken with the best intentions, not malevolent ones. As Judge
Posner writes, at the time the internment of Japanese Americans
seemed like a reasonable attempt to ensure public safety. Yet, in
retrospect, all agree that in placing so great a priority on public-
safety interests, the government acted unjustly and without suffi-
cient regard for the liberty interests of the Japanese-American
citizens.
It may well be that liberty must be curtailed when the public
need is great enough. But, at a minimum, we should interpret the
Constitution as embodying a cautionary rule: public safety should
be effectuated through the least intrusive means possible, allow-
ing maximum scope for personal liberty.
How, then, should we approach the practical questions of gov-
ernmental conduct arising in a post-September 11 world? With
our eyes wide open and with a dose of healthy skepticism. The
good news is that we have plenty of both. Courts and the Con-
170. Judge Richard Posner, The Truth about Our Liberties, THE RESPONSIVE
COMMUNITY, Summer 2002, at 4.




gress are casting a jaundiced eye at the administration's more ex-
travagant and overblown proposals for reform, while accommodat-
ing and expediting the more urgent and reasonable requests. Al-
ready, for example, the courts have rejected governmental claims
to the detention hearings secret and begun to scrutinize the clos-
ing of immigration hearings and the indefinite detention of indi-
viduals as material witnesses or unlawful combatants.1 2  The
press has accepted the challenge of fulfilling its traditional func-
tion as a check on authoritarian excess. Most importantly, the
pendulum of public opinion has steadied as the initial shock of
terrorism wears off. The American public instinctively under-
stands that prudential adjustments during times of crisis do not
(and should not) reset the balance between liberty and security
permanently. Once the necessity of war has lapsed, we anticipate
a return to the general rule of constitutional liberty.
Thomas Jefferson said: "The natural progress of things is for
liberty to yield and government to gain ground."7 While accom-
modating the need for government to ensure domestic tranquility
in these troubled times, a watchful America can guard against
this natural tendency.
But it cannot do so with an over-wrought sense of fear. Most of
the steps proposed to combat terror have already been used to
combat organized crime. And there is little evidence of any real
abuse.'74 No First Amendment liberties have been curtailed, no
dissent or criticism suppressed. 75 While Jefferson was right that
we must be cautious, John Locke, the seventeenth-century phi-
losopher who greatly influenced the Founding Fathers, was
equally right when he wrote: "In all states of created beings, capa-
ble of laws, where there is no law there is no freedom. For liberty
is to be free from the restraint and violence from others; which
cannot be where there is no law; and is not, as we are told, a lib-
erty for every man to do what he lists."'76 Thus, the obligation of
172. E.g., Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (requiring immi-
gration detention hearings to be open); North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308
F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002) (allowing detention hearings to be closed upon particularized show-
ing); U.S. v. Awadalah, 349 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2003) (allowing detention of material wit-
nesses for grand jury investigation); see also supra note 31 (review of detention of enemy
combatants and Guantanamo Bay detainees).
173. Letter to E. Carrington, May 27, 1788, reprinted in THE FOUNDERS' ALMANAC,
supra note 75, at 157.
174. See supra note 6.
175. See Chertoff, supra note 28, at 16 (making this claim). Critics can point to little, if
any, evidence rebutting this assertion.
176. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 305 (Peter Laslett, ed., 1988).
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the government is a dual one: to protect civil safety and security
against violence and to preserve civil liberty.
The time to address these issues is now. As Michael Chertoff,
the former Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division,
has written:
The balance [between liberty and the response to terror] was
struck in the first flush of emergency. If history shows any-
thing, however, it shows that we must be prepared to review
and if necessary recalibrate that balance. We should get
about doing so, in light of the experience of our forbearers and
the experience of our own time.
17
Others have echoed that call.' 8 But in reviewing what we have
done and what we should do in the future, we must be guided by
the realization that this is not a zero-sum game. We can achieve
both goals - liberty and security - to an appreciable degree. The
key is empowering government, while exercising oversight. So
long as we keep a vigilant eye on police authority, so long as the
federal courts remain open, and so long as the debate about gov-
ernmental conduct is a vibrant part of the American dialogue, the
risk of excessive encroachment on our fundamental liberties is
remote. The only real danger lies in silence and leaving policies
unexamined.
177. Chertoff, supra note 28, at 17.
178. E.g., Susan Schmidt, Bipartisan Debate on Patriot Act is Urged, WASH. POST, Nov.
14, 2003 (former Deputy Attorney General Thompson proposes bipartisan commission to
debate "the legal tools that should be employed in combating terrorism").
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